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The role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the China`s New Security Concept**

Abstract

Using the methods of content analyses we will anatomize the position of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), within China`s New Security Concept and multilateralism based on it. Introducing the new way of security perception is a confirmation that official Beijing becomes more active and constructive in creating supportive environment with the aim to realize national goals. The first part of this paper will tackle the changes that occurred in Chinese understanding of the security concept. This will help us to understand the reasons why People`s Republic of China (China) besides bilateral diplomacy, started to pursue the multilateral channels of communication. Simultaneously, those changes show us how China perceives position within the international order and relations with other states. The second part of this paper will be dedicated to the institutional development of the SCO. Analyzing institutional, logistical and personnel enlargement of the SCO, we will see what kind of goals, not only China, but as well other member states wanted to achieve. In the same part of this paper we will analyze the concrete movements that China triggered through or supported by this Organization with aim to create stable security architecture in Central Asian region. Stable environment is needed from both levels, economic and political.

Key words: *New Security Concept, economy, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Multilateralism, Central Asia, China, National interests;*

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought many uncertainties for the international security architecture. Many countries probed themselves what kind of strategies, ways of thinking and policies are the best choices to protect their own territory, economy, society and other aspects of national security. China was no exception. She also faced all these questions after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Geopolitical, diplomatic, geo-economic and military strength and power of China, in that moment was just the shadow of China that we know in the contemporary world.

Dissolution of the USSR resulted with new independent states on the world globe. More precisely all the states which were the part of the USSR, became independent. That was the way of modification of the geographical map of Central Asian space. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were pushed to pursue independent

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foreign and security policies, creating new institutions. Emerging of all these new states brought unfamiliar and blur dynamism to China`s security. Instead of one neighbor, USSR, China faced four of them - Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time China was frightened by the possibility that Xinjiang Autonomous Province could reinforce requests for creating "East Turkestan" independent state. Reasons for fear of that kind stem from objective reality and subjective Chinese strategic thinking. The first of them was that Uighurs could use this kind of situation to trigger secessionism and to boost it by terrorist attacks. The second reason was that Uighurs could use non-demarcated borders as a heritage of Sino-Soviet relations, which can question Chinese sovereignty. China`s point of view of sovereignty is very sensitive, because during the past had to sign `unequal treaties` and that was the beginning of century of humiliation in Chinese history.¹ The third reason was the cultural one. Namely, Xinjiang in cultural and linguistic way was more familiar with Central Asian states than with Han majority of Chinese population. Moreover, official Beijing expected that America will use the victory in the Cold War to shape the international security architecture. From Chinese point of view, was logic that America will use NATO and expanding of democracy to position itself in Central Asia.² This, from Chinese point of view, can help America not just to contain Russia and China, but also to prevent any possibility of creating axis of convenience between these two countries.

China was, and still is, burdened by both traditional and non-traditional set of security challenges. This was confirmed by official documents and statements. Namely, in *Full text of Hu Jintao`s report at 18th Party Congress* we can read that "China is faced with interwoven problems affecting its survival and development security as well as traditional and non-traditional security threats"³ Also in Xi Jinping`s remarks known as *New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation*, we can read that "Asia`s security challenges are extremely complicated, which include both hotspot and sensitive issues and ethnic and religious problems. The challenges brought by terrorism, transnational crimes, environmental security, cyber security, energy and resource security and major natural disasters are clearly on the rise. Traditional and non-traditional security threats are interwoven. Security is a growing issue in both scope and implication."⁴ Important non-traditional security challenge, but which can reinforce traditional security concerns is energy security. For China this kind of security and concerns which follow it, is highly ranked in domestic

1 More detailed on unequal treaties in, Dragana Mitrović, *Kineska reforma i svet*, Institut za ekonomiku i finansije, Beograd, 1995.

2 That was done when America started with Central Asian countries to create Partnerships for Peace. In 1994, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia as well became members of NATO`s Partnership for Peace. More detailed on this in, Bates Gill, *Rising Star – China`s New Security Diplomacy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2007.

3 *Full text of Hu Jintao`s report at 18th Party Congress*, Embassy of the People`s Republic of China in the United States of America, Available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zl/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/1992917.htm (accessed on 23/10/2018)

4 Xi Jinping, *New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml, (accessed on 23/10/2018) Also, Ambassador Shen Guofang argued that "Non-traditional security threats have become more striking. A variety of new issues, global and transnational, have developed continuously. We cannot be optimistic about the international security situation, what with the surge in energy prices, global warming, ecological crisis, the gap between the rich and the poor, cross-national crime, and frequent outbreaks of major epidemics." Shen Guofang, "Zhongguo Xin Waijiao de Linian yu Shijian" [The Concept and Practice of China`s New Diplomacy], *Shijie Zhishi* [World Affairs], No. 13, 2007, PP. 42-44, in, Evan S. Medeiros, *China`s Foreign Policy – Activism, Opportunism and Diversification*, RAND Corporation, USA, 2009, p. 37 The same situation has been confirmed, again, in the latest, 13th Five Year Plan, "Geopolitical competition is growing fiercer in some regions, traditional and non-traditional security threats have become intertwined, and international relations are more complicated than ever. With factors causing instability and uncertainty in China`s external environment growing markedly, greater risks and challenges will be faced in our country`s development." *The 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People`s Republic of China*, Available at: <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf>, (accessed on 21/10/2018)

and foreign policy. According to now already very noticeable facts, during 1993, China became net oil importer, and in 2010, she became, in absolute terms, the largest consumer of energy. The question of energy security, in big measure, shapes Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy behavior. Without stable energy sources, prices and routes, we are not able to speak about economic development of one country. China`s need for energy grew parallel to the economic development. Although China was exporter of oil very turbulent and unexpected economic development showed that China “was not well prepared for the nation`s accelerating growth and growing energy intensity. This situation resulted in shortages in oil, coal, and electricity and prolonged power shortages in many provinces. This demand surge and the corresponding shortages thrust energy security onto China`s foreign policy agenda, as Chinese companies made a mad dash to secure access to energy supplies.”⁵ According to British Petroleum, “energy consumption rose by 3.1% in China. China was the largest growth market for energy for the 17th consecutive year. Natural gas consumption rose by 96 billion cubic meters (bcm), or 3%, the fastest since 2010. Consumption growth was driven by China (31 bcm), the Middle East (28 bcm) and Europe (26 bcm). Consumption in the US fell by 1.2%, or 11 bcm. Global natural gas production increased by 131 bcm, or 4%, almost double the 10-year average growth rate. Russian growth was the largest at 46 bcm, followed by Iran (21 bcm).”⁶ These facts are in line with Chinese position which she has been creating since 1993 onward. Based on that, “energy security in China is the perception that the Chinese economy is highly dependent on a stable supply of energy and cannot tolerate the slightest interruption or shortfall.”⁷ This could be very convenient tool for Western super power and its “alliance octopus” to shape, to constrain or stereotype Chinese development. In that sense, “energy must be thought of in a strategic manner because it is directly related to national security.”⁸ Diversification of routes, energy sources and creating of strategic energy reserves was much more than needed.

It is quite obvious that there are myriad of reasons that China had to change understanding of security and to become more proactive, but constructive as well. From the new Security Concept (新安全观 - xīn ānquán guān), towards multilateralism, official Beijing boosted confidence in securing the stability in Asia. Later, this became a big part of the vision of Asian security. According to Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi, “the vision of Asian security has added a new dimension to China`s underlying thinking on security, enhanced the global influence of China`s thinking on security, and provided new guidelines for maintaining security and stability of both Asia and the world.”⁹

Creating this new position for China within the international order, followed by constant military modernization and great number of Chinese soldiers who are participating in UN

5 Evan. S. Medeiros, *China`s Foreign Policy – Activism, Opportunism and Diversification*, RAND Corporation, USA, 2009, p. 32

6 *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, 67th edition, British Petroleum, June, 2018, Available at: <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2018-full-report.pdf>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

7 Zha Daojing, “Energy Interdependence”, *China Security*, World Security Institute, Washington D.C. Summer, 2006, p. 2. Also, see in, Zha Daojing, *China`s Energy Security and its International Relations*, paper presented at the Third IISS Global Strategy Review, Geneva, Sept. 16-18, 2005, Available at: https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/Zha-Daojing_Chinas-Energy-Security.pdf, (accessed on 23/10/2018)

8 Li Xing and Chen Junqi, “China`s Changing Energy Mix: An Interview with Fan Bi”, *Cornerstone, The Official Journal of the World Coal Industry*, Available at: <http://cornerstonemag.net/chinas-changing-energy-mix-an-interview-with-fan-bi/>, (accessed on 16/10/2018)

9 *Full Text of Foreign Minister Wang Yi`s Speech on China`s Diplomacy in 2014*, Consulate General of People`s Republic of China in the United States of America, Available at: <http://newyork.china-consulate.org/eng/xw/t1223262.htm>, (accessed on 23/10/2018)

Peacekeeping Missions¹⁰ is confirmation that China wants to be creator of international relations "rules". Simultaneously, this imposes the question about Chinese self-confidence and nationalism.

2. New Security Concept and Chinese Multilateralism

Introduction of the New Security Concept and leaning towards proactive and constructive multilateralism, cannot be considered as a "kind of *ad hoc*, short-term reaction to outside stimulus. It also reflects its overall assessment of the nature and trends of the international system and the international environment, its evolving concepts of national security, and its deepening understanding of the function of multilateral diplomacy under new circumstances."¹¹ The New Security Concept was promulgated by Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, during the speech on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Summit in 1996. His speech was designation and formulation of the previously created praxis. China pointed the finger towards the zero sum way of thinking in international relations and obsolete Cold War mentality, obviously from strategic reasons. Qian Qichen during that speech "made a call for the abandonment of the "Cold War mentality" and for introduction of a "new security concept" that is based "neither on military build-up nor on military alliances", but is grounded on in "mutual trust and common interests".¹² This concept was accepted by third Communist generation run by Jiang Zemin, and it was incorporated in official document White Paper on China National Defense from 1998. It was embedded in first part of Document - the International Security Situation.¹³ If policy makers and foreign policy strategists put this concept within this kind of official document that represents China`s evolving understanding international security situation, trends within it and what kind of role she could have. In 2002, China released document China`s Position Paper on the New Security Concept. Within this document China gave more precise meaning of this concept, but again is just a reformulation of a previously perpetuated praxis. Namely, "in China`s view, the core of such new security concept should include mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination."¹⁴ Regarding the objective of this paper, we will focus our research on Chinese pursuing the New Security Concept among Central Asian states. We hereby question whether the China`s view of interest is the same as its neighbors? What part of this New Security Concept will be for promotion of China`s interests and what part will be for promotion of neighbors` interests? Xi Jinping in *Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries Characterized by Friendship, Sincerity, Reciprocity and Inclusiveness* speech accentuated "the China`s diplomacy in this area [neighborhood] is driven by and must serve the Two Centenary Goals and our national rejuvenation. To achieve these strategic aims, we must... maintain and make best use of the strategic opportunities we now enjoy, and safeguard

10 More detailed on this in UN Peacekeeping Missions – China, Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/china>, (accessed on 26/10/2018)

11 Jianwei Wang, "China`s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium", in Y. Dong and F. Wang (eds.), *China Rising – Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC, New York, 2005, p. 160.

12 Opening statement by H.E. Qian Qichen, vice premier and minister of foreign affairs of the People`s Republic of China, ASEAN Regional Forum, Subang Jaya, July 27, 1997., in Jianwei Wang, "China`s Multilateral Diplomacy in the new Millennium", y Yong Deng, Fei-ling Wang (eds.), *China Rising – power and motivation in Chinese foreign policy*, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, New York, 2005, p. 175.

13 *White Paper on China`s National Defense - The International Security Situation*, Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/5.1.htm>, (accessed on 02/10/2018)

14 *China`s Position Paper on New Security Concept*, Ministry of Foreign AFFAIRS OF People`s Republic of China, Available at: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm>, (accessed on 11/10/2018)

China`s state sovereignty, national security, and development interests.”¹⁵ Chinese president during the speech on Peripheral Working Diplomacy Conference, underlined once again the strategic importance of neighboring countries. According to him, official Beijing has to make these “countries kinder and more intimate to China and meanwhile more recognize and support China, thereby increasing China`s affinity and influence.”¹⁶ We can see that stable neighborhood is strategic necessity for China, if wants to pursue economic development plans.

Besides bilateral relations that China stipulated and then developed with new neighbors, she also wanted to promote multilateralism. Facing China Threat Theory, China Collapse Theory and many other discourses which emphasized negative impacts of Chinese development, was the alarm that China must improve its international image, status, position and place regarding the global power distribution. Professor Dragana Mitrović says that the „opposition from Washington obstructed this power sharing and China was pushed toward creating parallel paths and mechanisms for global governance, while pursuing reform of the existing situation from within.”¹⁷ A significant part in this process was played by the dominant and creative personality of Xi Jinping, the new Chinese president and CCP Central Committee`s general secretary.”¹⁸ China knew that if not change its understanding of security and if not take proactive stance regarding multilateral diplomacy and multipolarity, she will be contained within the framework of regional state. For the purpose of this paper we will use Alexander Dugin`s definition of a regional state. He says that “regional state is a contemporary geopolitical category, with features of big and developed country, but which interests are limited just on surrounding areas or own territory.”¹⁹ According to him, regional state although have influence on its vicinity, it is weaker than super power and contained by it. Chinese policy and strategy makers, but analysts as well, suspected that *pax Americana* reinforced by American unilateralism and global military dominance will jeopardize further Chinese development. In that sense, one of the Chinese concerns is the development of the “‘Asian NATO’ (亚洲版的北约). This concept is occasionally used in the context of PRC media and academic discussion suggesting that a U.S. goal is to link its allies and partners together into a NATO-like structure targeted at China.”²⁰ This was

15 Xi Jinping, “Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries Characterized by Friendship, Sincerity, Reciprocity and Inclusiveness”, October 24, 2013, *Xi Jinping – The Governance of China*, Foreign Language PRESS, p. 326.

16 *Important Speech of Xi Jinping at Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference*, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, Available at: http://www.cciced.net/cciceden/NEWSCENTER/LatestEnvironmentalandDevelopment-News/201310/t20131030_82626.html, accessed on (23/10/2018)

17 Regarding Chinese reforms of international institutions on this place we accentuate the Memorandum of Understanding which China Exim Bank signed with the World Bank in 2007. According to Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves, “Beijing has been pushing the institution to accept new operational norms in co-financed loan packages. This new development is to a large degree the result of China`s emergence as a co-donor with the World Bank and its growing financial clout in developing regions, which combined have positioned China`s relationship with the World Bank on a more equal footing. The weakening of Western leadership and Bretton Woods` institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has opened a window for China to become more assertive in pushing forward its preferred norms and practices in recent years. While continuing to selectively internalise global norms, China has started to imprint some of its alternative norms to these institutions, a process that Chin calls ‘two-way socialisation.’” Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves, “China`s Regional Forum Diplomacy in Developing World: Socialisation and the `Sinosphere`”, *Journal of Contemporary china*, Vol. 26, Issue. 113, 2017, p. 4;

18 Dragana Mitrovic, “China`s Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting and Transforming Initiative”, in, Y. Cheng et al (eds.), *The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Arena*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2018, p. 19.

19 Александар Дугин, *Основи геополитике – књига 1*, Екопрес, Зрењанин, 2004, p. 176.

20 Joel Wuthnow, “U.S. `Minilateralism` in Asia and China`s Responses: A New Security Dilemma”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, Published online on July 17, 2018, p. 11; Also about this to see in, Dragana Mitrović, *Strategijsko-bezbednosna pozicija Kine posle 11.septembra 2001. godine*, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, Beograd, p. 1, Available at: <http://www.bezbednost.org/>

reinforced after September 11, 2001. Namely, USA after declaring the War on terrorism, used this to promote and spread NATO in Asia, up to Chinese borders. In that way America wanted to promote national arrangements that have with Asian allies. Xing Guangcheng, has emphasized China's reasons for opposing NATO geopolitical and military infiltration and penetration of region. He gives four reasons, "First, NATO's increased presence will generate an arms race. Second, closer military ties between NATO and the Central Asian states will not promote the elimination of "hot spots" in the region, but rather aggravate military confrontation. Third, NATO's constant military exercises cannot help but cause concern and alarm in China. Fourth, some NATO members have provided secret support to nationalist separatist activities in the Chinese region of Xinjiang, which directly threatens China's security and stability."²¹ Firstly, we have to accentuate that China didn't create and pursue regionalization of Central Asia as a response towards American aggressive presence. As we will discuss in next part of paper the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created for other purposes. Simultaneously, it is not excluded that China will not use the SCO to prevent American further geopolitical, military, ideational and economic influence within Central Asian Region. Secondly, China sees this as continuation of the Cold War mentality, which demonstrate White Papers on China's Defense. For example the official Beijing statement says that the "the world is at a critical stage, moving toward multi-polarity. Progress is expected in addressing the serious imbalances in the international strategic alignment. Hegemonism and power politics remain key factors undermining international security. A revolution in military affairs is developing in depth worldwide. The United States is accelerating its realignment of military deployment to enhance its military capability."²² In another official document of the same category we can read that "Hegemonism and power politics still exist, regional turmoil keeps spilling over, hot-spot issues are increasing, and local conflicts and wars keep emerging. International military competition is becoming increasingly intense, and the world wide revolution in military affairs (RMA) is reaching a new stage of development. Some major powers are realigning their security and military strategies, increasing their defense investment, speeding up the transformation of armed forces, and developing advanced military technology, weapons and equipment."²³ At the same time, China knows and as objective facts show, the position of America in contemporary world is not strong as it was.²⁴ We can then suppose, that although China underlines

upload/document/mitrovi_2005_strategijsko-bezbednosna_pozicija_kin.pdf, 戴旭: 中国应给美国围堵行为划红线' (Dài xù: Zhōngguó yīng gěi měiguó wéi dǔ xíngwéi huà hóngxiàn - Dai Xu: China Should Draw a Red Line against U.S. Containment Behavior'), the article has been published 2 August 2010, Available at: <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/12317779.html>, (accessed on 24/10/2018); Wang Xiaonan, "Internal division and historical wariness mean 'Asian NATO' not on cards", *Global Times*, the article has been published on October 31, 2013, Available at: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/821760.shtml>, (accessed on 24/10/2018)

21 Xing Guangcheng, "China's Foreign Policy Towards Kazakhstan", pp.110-111, in P. Pham, "Beijing's Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 28, Issue, 1, 2006.

22 China's *National Defense in 2006*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Available at: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#2>, (accessed on 11/10/2018)

23 China's *National Defense in 2008*, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Available at: https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf, accessed on 11/10/2018.

24 Xi Jinping emphasized that today's world is changing. It is a world in which new opportunities and new challenges keep emerging, a world in which the international system and international order are going through deep adjustment and a world in which the relative international forces are in profound shift in favor of peace and development. We must continue to pursue both an independent foreign policy of peace and peaceful development, uphold international justice, work for greater democracy in international relations, promote mutual benefit, advance economic diplomacy, jointly address multiple global challenges, promote the progress of human civilization and continue to open up new horizon in China's diplomatic. *The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml, (accessed on 24/10/2018)

that hegemonism still exists, because America is striving to maintain position which inherited from the Cold War victory, multilateralism and multi-polarity are irreversible processes within the international order. The official document *China`s Defense in 2010* says that “The progress toward economic globalization and a multi-polar world is irreversible, as is the advance toward informationization of society.”²⁵ The same way of thinking about trend of multi-polarity on both regional and international level is confirmed within the first *China`s Military Strategy*, especially in the following paragraphs “profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance structure.”²⁶ We can see that multi-polarity and in mind with that multilateralism is increasing while the post-Cold War unilateralism, although that kind of mind according to Chinese official still exists, is decreasing. Taking the more proactive posture towards security challenges China on November 2013 created National Security Commission of the Communist Party of China. At the same time “the slow development of multipolarity—and specifically the U.S. ability to maintain its position of global predominance and its perceived preference for unilateral use of military force to advance its interests—has been a long-standing source of concern for many Chinese policymakers and strategists.”²⁷ Chinese officials in that way expressed its concerns about unipolarity and hegemony that USA wanted to pursue on global level. Chinese policy makers and analysts were aware that through multilateralism they could soften American strength, but at the same time not to wake up concerns among American politicians, strategist and analysts. This is very important because, China does not fit into American matrix and prism of democracy, so any attempt of China to implement its own values was challenged by America. In that sense, “Huang Renwei, characterized U.S. policy this way: the United States has been trying to “regulate” and confine China’s international behavior with the international rules and regulations that have been set under its dominance, with a view to slowing down China’s development as well as to guarding against and doing away with the latent threat of China’s challenge to US hegemony. . . . The United States has been attempting to raise the “democracy criteria” that bar China from access to the international system, and to infiltrate China with Western values, with a view to transforming China from a country of “different nature and different category” into one of the “same nature and same category.” At the same time, by encroaching upon national sovereignty through the international system, the US and Western force is exerting greater and greater influence on China’s internal evolution process.”²⁸ As we can see China needed to start to think about its own soft power vision, because America wanted to see China as a responsible international state, but under Western political thought, vision and rules.

Chinese security position was additionally complicated by energy security, i.e. China became energy dependent country from foreign resources. Absence of strong “blue military navy”, with American control of the sea lines of communication and invasion on Iraq reinforced by military and geopolitical control over Middle East and due to the instability

25 *China`s National Defense in 2010*, Ministry of National Defense of the People`s Republic of China, Available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_4778206.htm, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

26 *China`s Military Strategy ,2015*, Ministry of Nation Defense of the People`s Republic of China, Available at: <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/>, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

27 Evan. S. Medeiros, *China`s Foreign Policy – Activism, Opportunism and Diversification*, RAND Corporation, USA, 2009, p. 328.

28 Evan. S. Medeiros, *China`s Foreign Policy – Activism, Opportunism and Diversification*, RAND Corporation, USA, 2009, p. 32.

of Malacca strait, challenged China to diversify the sources and routes of energy. China had had to reassess its position in the region and its role in shaping the security. Due to this geostrategic situation, Central Asian region emerged as geographically, geopolitically and geo-economic logic choice of diversification routes and sources of energy security. Diversification of energy supply is in accordance with Chinese attempts to create strategic reserves.²⁹ China, also, showed more intense interest for Central Asian abundant natural resources when "Japan tried to persuade Moscow in late 2002 to extend the pipeline to the Pacific coast instead. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reaffirmed these intentions on his first official visit to Russia in January 2003 when the two parties signed a six-point "action plan" calling for cooperation in economics, energy and international diplomacy. The offer Japan provided was a financial package worth US\$7 billion, including a US\$5 billion investment for pipeline construction and US\$2 billion in loans for the development of Siberian oilfields."³⁰ Zealous Chinese energy diplomacy, was enriched by some changes in the legal system and administration as well.³¹ Promulgating those changes China opened market for foreign direct investments.

Introducing the New Security Concept was motivated by traditional security concerns and indirect consequences triggered by the end of the Cold War. One of that was the heritage of unresolved, on the first glance, territorial disputes that China had with Soviet Union. As we can see one of indirect consequences that affected China was opening new territorial disputes on western border. In that kind of situation unresolved territorial disputes could produce, not just big challenges, but also a real danger, to Chinese state sovereignty and social security, creating fertile ground for social uprisings and riots. Official Beijing was concerned about future Xinjiang intentions and about the role of Central Asian states regarding the Xinjiang position, because their identity, language and culture belong to turcofone group. At the very begging of the new age in Chinese relations with Central Asian states, China requested big part of territory. According to Sebastian Peyrouse, "China questioned 22 percent of the total surface area of Central Asia: it laid claim to a territory stretching from Semirechie to Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan, almost all of Kyrgyzstan, and some 28,000

29 Namely, "Chinese officials raised the possibility of building a national strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) in 1993 and codified the proposal in China's Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2005). This program was in progress by 2004; the first of these facilities, located in Zhenhai, was completed in August 2006, with a capacity to store 32 mbl of oil. The second, at Zhoushan (25mbl) was completed in March 2007; the third and fourth, at Huangdao (25 mbl) and Dalian (25 mbl), were completed ahead of schedule, in December 2007. These form the first project's three phases, the final goal of which is to provide ninety days' oil supply by 2020." Bernard D. Cole, *China's Quest for Great Power*, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2016, p. 146.

30 Xuanli Liao, "Central Asia and China's Energy Security", *China Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, p. 64.

31 For example, changes in the Chinese legal system were confirmed by document China's Energy Policy 2012, "the legal system of energy-related laws has been strengthened, and a number of laws and regulations have been amended and published in the past few years, including the Energy Conservation Law, Renewable Energy Law, Circular Economy Promotion Law, Law on the Protection of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines, Regulations on Energy Conservation in Civil Buildings, and Regulations on Energy Conservation by Public Institutions. China upholds a policy of opening to the rest of the world in the field of energy. To provide a favorable environment for foreign investment and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors, it has promulgated a series of laws and regulations in succession, like the Law on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures and Law on Foreign Investment Enterprises, and framed such policy documents as the Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment and the Catalogue of Advantageous Industries for Foreign Investment in the Central and Western Regions. The Chinese government encourages foreign investment to engage in the exploration and development of oil, natural gas and unconventional oil and gas resources, such as shale gas and coal-bed gas, by way of cooperation; invites foreign investment in the building of new-energy power stations, hydroelectric power stations, clean-combustion power stations, and nuclear power stations as long as the Chinese partners have control; and supports multinational energy corporations to set up R&D centers in China." *China's Energy Policy 2012*, The State Council of the People's Republic of China, Available at: http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284499.htm, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

km² in the Pamir region of Tajikistan. However, with the opening of negotiations, the Chinese authorities toned down their claims and opted for a “good neighborhood” strategy with the new independent states. They agreed to reduce their territorial claims to “only” 34,000 km², chiefly out of a desire to secure allies in Central Asia.³² Further negotiations were organized on “fifty-fifty” formula.³³ As we can see China realized that those requests, before she changed them, are not in line with new security thinking, good neighborhood vision and could produce sinophobia effect among Central Asian political elites and societies. With aim to avoid spill-over effects of unresolved borders on Uighurs actions, was the initial spark of creating the SCO. Apart from these reasons, according to Taylor Fravel one state can change territorial claims due to crucial strategic and security objectives. He gives seven reasons why one state might follow diplomacy of “trade territorial concessions for direct assistance in crushing the uprising, such as (1) sealing borders; (2) attacking rebel bases; (3) denying refuge or material support to rebels; (4) extraditing rebel leaders; (5) minimizing inadvertent escalation during hot pursuit; (6) providing assurances not to intervene; or (7) affirming their state’s sovereignty over the region of unrest.”³⁴ Regarding the position of Xinjiang we can see that obtaining the support for all of these seven factors is a great diplomatic, but also geopolitical victory for China. On the other hand, resolving border disputes without using military tools, i.e. through diplomatic channels is also important for economic reasons. Instead of wasting resources, both material and human, China adopted cooperative security to realize national interests, but at the same time to create supportive environment for its further economic development. According to professor Dragana Mitrović, “above all was the need of removal of the military threat as an obstacle to the Chinese strategic orientation towards the non-military economic development, which could give space to the reduction of the Chinese army and the military budget.”³⁵ We can see that China did not want to restart military confrontation to resolve “west threat” to sovereignty, instead official Beijing started to promulgate multilateralism, cooperation and geo-economic ways for realizing national security. We can see that formulation of strategic decisions as a pathway of foreign policy compromises “four areas: 1) military-security; 2) political-diplomacy; 3) economic-development; 4) cultural status.”³⁶

3. New Security Concept in praxis – the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

In the document China`s Position Paper on the New Security Concept we find information that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is “a successful case of the new security concept.”³⁷ The SCO stems from Chinese efforts to stabilize border areas with new neighborhoods. The former Sino-Soviet border experienced dramatic changes. Ge-

32 S. Peyrouse, “Discussing China: Sinophilia and Sinophobia in Central Asia”, *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 7 (2016), p. 14.

33 More detailed on this see in, Iwashita Akihiro, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Beyond a Miscalculation on Power Games”, in, Christopher Len et al (eds.), *Japan`s Silk Road Diplomacy – Paving the Road Ahead*, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, USA, 2008.

34 Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation – Explaining China`s Compromises in Territorial Disputes”, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2015, p. 53.

35 Dragana Mitrović, “PR China`s Border Issues within the Framework of Modernization and Opening Up”, *LiCCOSEC*, Vol. 17, Research Institute for World Languages, Osaka University, Japan, 2011, p. 79.

36 Timur Dadabaev “Chinese and Japanese foreign policies towards central Asia a comparative perspective”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2014, p. 126, pp. 123–145.

37 *China`s Position Paper on the New Security Concept*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China, Available at: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm>, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

ographic map was changed, because “the western part was divided into four sections – the 50-kilometer Russo-Chinese border, the 1700- kilometer Kazakh-Chinese border, the 1000-kilometer Kyrgyz-Chinese border, and the 430-kilometer Tajik-Chinese border, while the eastern part was totally succeeded by the Russo-Chinese border.”³⁸ In order to avoid challenges and to use possibilities created by new balance of power, i.e. by collapse of Soviet Union, China started to negotiate with new neighbors. At the very beginning of negotiations, China was on one side, while three Central Asian states plus Russia were on the other. Although, as is quite obvious China initiated this process, three Central Asian states wanted Russia as a guarantee that China will not use their weak position, as it was when China requested very big parts of territory. In that moment the newly created states in sense of independence in Central Asian region “agreed to sit at a table to discuss it through the mediation of Russia. The “4 (Russia + three Central Asian states) + 1 (China)” negotiation formula was created by the Russo-Chinese “partnership” in due observance of the Russo-Chinese border agreements. After 1993, the “4+1” formula served for two regular committees, for confidence-building and arms reduction and for joint boundary demarcation, which later became the bodies of the so-called “Shanghai Five”.³⁹ China welcomed participation of Russia, as one of the stakeholder of this process, because she could, additionally, reinforce the trust with “shaft carriage” of the former Soviet Union. The first fruit born by the negotiation committees was the multilateral arrangement which aim was to stabilize border areas through reduction of military troops. In line with that China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed, in Shanghai in 1996, Agreement on Confidence Building in Military Sphere in the Border Areas. That was the start of the new type of cooperation, but first of all, multilateral one initiated by China. The importance of this multilateral gathering and signing Agreement of this kind has enormous notability for Chinese side. According to Michael Yahuda “thus it was only in 1996 (forty-seven years after the establishment of the PRC) that China signed its first multilateral security agreement.”⁴⁰

During the next summit which took place in Moscow on April 24 1997, representatives, i.e. presidents, of five states signed Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. We can see that “all concerned states agreed to stabilize their border areas by establishing non-military zones and promising the exchange of military information.”⁴¹ Each subsequent summit of the Shanghai Five mechanism was dedicated to analyzing regional security situation and the ways for upgrading it. When it comes to the issue of deepening regional security cooperation, we would like to accentuate the Dushanbe summit. This gathering of presidents of the member states of the Shanghai Five was held on July 5 2000. Namely, “on that summit Uzbekistan took for the first time a position as a country observer.”⁴² Also,

38 Iwashita Akihiro, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Implication for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” after the Post-Cold War Period*, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, p. 262, Available at: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-1_iwashita.pdf, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

39 Iwashita Akihiro, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Implication for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” after the Post-Cold War Period*, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, p. 262, Available at: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-1_iwashita.pdf, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

40 Michael Yahuda, “Chinese dilemmas in thinking about regional security architecture”, *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 16, No. 12, 2003, p. 198.

41 Iwashita Akihiro, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Implication for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” after the Post-Cold War Period*, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, p. 262, Available at: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-1_iwashita.pdf, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

42 Драгана Митровић, Шангајска организација за сарадњу – настанак, циљеви и дometri нове безбедносно-економске

in July of the same year member states organized the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. On the next summit which took place in Shanghai on June 14-16 2001, Uzbekistan became the full member of this Mechanism. On this place we would like to draw attention to date of founding of the SCO. Namely, we can see that is not correct to say that the SCO was created as a Chinese response towards American war on terror. But, we cannot also say that China will not use Organization to ease American presence among western neighbors. Astana summit from 2005, confirms this. According to Declaration of this summit "given the completion of the active military phase of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization deem it necessary for the relevant participating states of the antiterrorist coalition to set a deadline for the temporary use of said infrastructure and presence of their military contingents in the territory of the SCO member states."⁴³ As professor Dragana Mitrović notices, "the awareness of self-responsibility has been activated, as well as a self-esteem about problem resolving by own means and potentials."⁴⁴ After that the role of the SCO-Afghanistan contact group has been accentuated. According to Xi Jinping "it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation."⁴⁵

The accession of Uzbekistan was the confirmation that countries in Central Asian region started to realize the potential of this platform for cooperation. Also, six member states China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed the Shanghai Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO. The Secretariat of the SCO is based in Beijing. Shanghai besides geographic meaning, by establishing the SCO got another– discursive one. Namely, the SCO is guided by `Shanghai Spirit`. According to the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO the Shanghai spirit represents "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, joint consultations, respect for cultural diversity and aspiration for collective development."⁴⁶ Shanghai spirit and the New Security Concept as we can see are based on identical set of norms as a part of Chinese efforts to create stable neighborhood. China was accused that through `Shanghai spirit` is reinforcing authoritarian regimes and that she is not respecting human rights and western democratic principles. That was quite expecting because China has the value system based on different parameters and tradition. Thomas Ambrosio argues that "the `Shanghai Spirit` - the set of principles underlying the SCO – is inherently conservative and designed to preserve the autocratic regimes in the region. While not an alliance in the traditional sense, the SCO represents a formidable challenge to the ideas of universal democracy and human rights through its *de facto* legitimization of authoritarianism and by establishing itself as a counterweight to external democratic norms."⁴⁷

структуре Азије, Српска политичка мисао, број 1-2, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, стр. 224.

43 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, July 5, 2005, retrieved from: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed: 12.10.2018)

44 Драгана Митровић, „ШОС – проблеми и перспективе развоја“, Српска политичка мисао, број 3-4, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, стр. 136.

45 Xi Jinping, *New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/11159951.shtml, accessed on 23/10/2018

46 Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, Available at: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

47 Thomas Ambrosio, "Catching the `Shanghai Spirit`: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in

On the same summit, 2001, six member states signed the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.⁴⁸ The SCO started to reshape the security architecture of Central Asia regarding these non-traditional security challenges, before American war against terrorism. The SCO was the first international organization, which had fighting “three evils” – terrorism, separatism and religious extremism stated as the main objective and purpose of the Organization. The SCO does not tackle “three evils” just on ideational and discursive level, but on the practical one too. In line with that Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) was created in Bishkek. Many scholars, then, accused the SCO that is becoming military organization. Uighurs’ pretensions boosted by terrorist attacks with aim to create “East Turkestan” were diminished and Chinese fight against “three evils” obtained a new momentum. This new momentum was also reaffirmed by joint military exercises. From confidence building measures in military affairs to prevent future clashes, member states of the SCO started to conduct military exercises. This represents tremendous step in securing domestic, regional and international security, boosting regionalism, establishing new security architecture and maturation of Chinese multilateral diplomacy. China organizes military exercises with western neighbors and with Russia, on both bilateral and multilateral level. At the same time “China pioneered a joint military exercise among SCO members. The Chinese troops conducted joint military exercise with the Kyrgyz forces in October 2002. At the Moscow summit in May 2003, pushed by the SCO leaders, SCO defence ministers signed a memorandum on joint military exercises to be carried out in autumn 2003.”⁴⁹ Based on this decisions all “5 member states, except Uzbekistan, are taking part in “Cooperation 2003”, two-phases anti-terrorist drill, with participation of 1000 representatives of five armies on territories of Kazakhstan and China, respectively.”⁵⁰ Regarding, up to then Chinese point of view about military presence on territory, this military exercise is going far away from the SCO framework. Namely, “it is the first large scale multilateral anti-terrorist exercise that the Chinese army has participated in, and it is also the first time that China has invited foreign armies into its territory.”⁵¹ During April in 2006, ministers of defense of the SCO members decided to conduct another anti-terrorist military exercise in 2007.⁵² The name of drill was “Peace Mission 2007. Uzbekistan wanted to take part in this

Central Asia”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 8, October 2008, p. 1322.

48 Supplementary to the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, the member states of the SCO signed more documents regarding this issue. They signed the following documents: *Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking in Arms, Ammunition and Explosives between the Governments of the member states of the SCO*; *Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization against Terrorism*; *Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crime between the Governments of the member states of the SCO*; *Statement by the heads of the member states of the SCO on joint counteraction to international terrorism*.

49 Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium”, in Y. Dong and F. Wang (eds.), *China Rising – Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC, New York, 2005, p. 181.

50 Драгана Митровић, Шангајска организација за сарадњу – настанак, циљеви и дometи нове безбедносно-економске структуре Азије, Српска политичка мисао, број 1-2, Институт за политичке студије, Београд.

51 Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium”, in Y. Dong and F. Wang (eds.), *China Rising – Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy*, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC, New York, 2005, p. 181

52 The latest 15th Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Defence Ministers Meeting, was held in Beijing, from 23-24 April, 2018. “During the meeting, the heads of defence agencies had a friendly and open discussion, exchanging views on international and regional security matters, the further strengthening of defence and security cooperation, and other issues of shared interest. The participants in the meeting reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing trust among SCO member states on military matters, and working together to counter new challenges and threats, as well as ensuring that peace, stability and security in the region remain priorities for SCO member states. Another important development on the meeting’s agenda was Uzbekistan’s accession to the Cooperation Agreement among SCO Defence Ministries dated 15 May 2008. The Defence Minister of Uzbekistan signed the agreement at the meeting. The heads of defence agencies praised the Chinese Defence Ministry for preparing the meeting and expressed thanks for the hospitality. Following the meeting, the SCO

anti-terrorist training. Besides that, the city of Kashgar, Xinjiang, hosted joint anti-terrorism drills "Tianshan-2-2011" of the special services and law enforcement agencies of the SCO from 5 to 8 May 2011, "in the framework of the SCO RATS Council decision of 23 September 2010."⁵³ The latest "Peace Mission 2018" initiated on August 24 at Chebarkul, Russia. This anti-terrorist maneuver "will provide an opportunity to military contingents **of the all eight SCO member nations** (bolded by the author) participating in this exercise, to train in counter terrorism operations in urban scenario in a multinational and joint environment. The scope of the exercise includes professional interaction, mutual understanding of drills & procedures, establishment of joint command and control structures and elimination of terrorist threat in urban counter terrorist scenario. The Russian Army has the major participation of 1700 personnel followed by China with 700 & India with 200 personnel. The SCO Peace Mission Exercise is one of the major defense cooperation initiatives amongst SCO nations and will be a landmark event in the history of SCO defense cooperation."⁵⁴

As we can see the latest anti-terroristic military drill included 8 participants as the member states. That is the result of the SCO, geopolitical, geographical, diplomatic, cultural and strategic enlargement which ushered Organization in new period of security challenges and opportunities. Namely, last year, 2017, India and Pakistan became the full member states of this prestigious Organization. The opinions about this are contradictor and controversial. However, "the SCO is showing openness towards other countries that have a stake in "common interests" with the SCO."⁵⁵ This is in line with the Shanghai Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO which emphasizes that "the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not an alliance directed against other states and regions, and it adheres to the principle of openness."⁵⁶ The creating of partnerships with other countries was once again underlined by Dushanbe Declaration from 2008.⁵⁷ We can also see this as Chinese attempts to widen its support for gigantic and pretentious project known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).⁵⁸ Anyway is this a fruitful choice, regarding Indian position. In the latest Press release on the SCO Council of Foreign Ministers meeting Indian support of the BRI was missing. Besides the following lines "the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ta-

Defence Ministers signed the Meeting Minutes and a Joint Communiqué. The meeting participants agreed to hold the next SCO Defence Ministers Meeting in Kyrgyzstan in 2019. Press Release on the 15th Shanghai Cooperation Organization`s Defence Ministers Meeting, SCO-China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People`s Republic of China, Available at: <http://scochina.mfa.gov.cn/eng/dtxw/t1565935.htm>, (accessed on 18/10/2018)

53 Anatoliy A. Rozanov, "The Issue of Security in the SCO", in Anatoliy A. Rozanov (ed.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia`s Security Challenges*, The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, May, 2013, p. 44. Also see in, Wang Huazhong, "SCO Members brace for terrorist threat", *China Daily*, the article has been published on May 9, 2011, Available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-05/09/content_12470514.htm, (accessed on 16/10/2018)

54 *Opening Ceremony Exercise SCO Peace Mission 2018*, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Available at: <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183039>, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

55 Iwashita Akihiro, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its Implication for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of "Partnership" after the Post-Cold War Period*, Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, p. 276, Available at: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-1_lwashita.pdf, (accessed on 12/10/2018)

56 *The Shanghai Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO*, Available at: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

57 According to this Declaration, "the dynamic development of the Organization will contribute to strengthening strategic stability, maintaining peace and security. The SCO member states will continue making joint efforts aimed at establishing close cooperation with other interested countries, international and regional organizations in order to create a broad partner network." *Dushanbe Declaration*, 2008, retrieved from: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed on 24.10.2018)

58 *How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China`s interests?* Available at: <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/>, (accessed on 24/10/2018)

Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan reaffirmed their support for China's Belt and Road initiative and called for using the capabilities of regional states, international organizations and multi-lateral bodies to build a broad, inclusive, mutually beneficial and equal partnership within the SCO⁵⁹, any further explanation was not provided. Maybe the main reason is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for which Indian authorities say that is passing through large part of Kashmir, by Pakistan occupied territory.⁶⁰ However, with India as a member nation the democratic capacity of the SCO has another dimension, because India is the biggest democracy on the world, regarding the number of population.

When we take a look on the changed membership – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Indian, Pakistan - of the SCO, firstly we can notice that the only country of the Central Asian region which is not the member of the Organization is Turkmenistan. That is the result of Turkmenistan policy of neutrality, also confirmed by UN. Simultaneously we can notice asymmetry regarding economy, diplomatic, geopolitical and military power, diversity of tradition, but also and asymmetry in energy resources. China is building its position among Central Asian states regarding this issue, as a part of changed energy diplomacy and leaning towards diversification of routes and energy sources and creating strategic energy reserves. Cooperation in energy security, firstly in oil and in gas, between China and Central Asian states started to develop after Jiang Zemin's visit of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in 1996. Former Chinese president expressed desire "to explore new channels of cooperation with these countries. Soon afterwards, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) won a tender to develop two oil fields in Akhtubinsk and an oilfield in Uzen in competition with Texaco, Amoco and Russia's Yuzhymost. The deal entailed a significant US\$4.3 billion investment spanning over 20 years, and an agreement to build a 2,800km cross-border oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China was also reached."⁶¹ One part of proposed cross-border oil pipeline with length of 962.2 km is operational since 2006. It starts from Alatau in Kazakhstan and finishes in Xinjiang autonomous province.⁶² Xinjiang through domestic pipeline infrastructure will reach the rest of the Chinese territory, especially eastern parts. The import of gas started, when Central-Asia-China pipeline became operative. This pipeline is composed by four lines, A, B, C and D. It starts in Geidam, the city on the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border, and finishes in Xinjiang. The route of pipeline is burdened by "various geographical features, such as uneven terrain including, for example, the soft riverbeds of the Ili and Syr Darya Rivers, which posed construction problems for engineers. To address this problem, contractors used di-

59 Press release on the Council of the Foreign Ministers meeting, Available at: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed on 13/10/2018.)

60 The one aspect of the OBOR that has caused the greatest concern in India, both in regard to its land and maritime implications, is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Finalised in April 2015 on the basis of 51 agreements, the CPEC consists of a series of highway, railway and energy projects, emanating from the newly developed port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, all of which taken together will be valued at 46 billion US dollars. These projects will generate 700,000 jobs in Pakistan and, when completed, add 2-2.5 per cent to the country's GDP. The CPEC has been described as a "flagship project" for the OBOR. Talmiz Ahmad, "Silk Road to (economic) heaven", *Herald*, the article has been published on Jun 18, 2016, Available at: <https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153432>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

61 Xuanli Liao, "Central Asia and China's Energy Security", *China Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, p. 63.

62 As we can see 962 km cross-border oil pipeline is "just the first phase of the, already, planned 3000 km oil pipeline, which value is 3 billion of US\$. Through this pipeline the crude oil will be exported to China from the Caspian sea. It will start in Atyrau, crossing Kenkyiak, to Kumkole, respectively, then to Atasau in Kazakhstan, reaching Alashankou, Xinjiang, the city near to Sino-Kazakhstan border. The pipeline is joint ownership of KazMunayGas and CNPC." Драгана Митровић, Драган Траиловић, „Геополитика кинеске енергетске стратегије у централној Азији“, Српска политичка мисао, број, 2, 2014, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, стр. 143.

rectional drilling-crossing technologies, placing 1.1km pipes 30m below the Ili riverbed without causing harm to the local environment. Line A and Line B, each measuring 1,833km in length. The diameter of the pipeline is 1,067mm, with walls of 15,9mm and 19.1mm.”⁶³ This gas pipeline transported 4,38 bcm of gas to China`s gas transportation grid in 2010. Section C is also operative since 2014,⁶⁴ and line D is the shortest one.⁶⁵

With aim to secure position in Central Asian region, regarding energy sector, Chinese companies or invested or purchased new assets, oil and gas fields. For example, in 2005 “CNPC bought for 5 billion US\$ from KazMunaiGas 8.33% of Kashnagan oilfields located in Caspian Sea.”⁶⁶ Also, “in September 2009 Xinjiang Guanghui Investment Company purchased Kazakhstan TBM`s 49% share to jointly develop Zaysan block in eastern Kazakhstan. The value of this project was 0.3 billion US\$. In April 2009 CNPC and KMG purchased 100% of MMG in Kazakhstan for 1.7 billion US\$. In 2004 Sinopec purchased petroleum assets of share 100% from First International Oil Corporation for 0.153 billion US\$.”⁶⁷ According to officials “China must join the regional geo-economic and geopolitical activities for our circumjacent security and oil supply security. The rivalry between the United States and Russia (in Central Asia) will soon become quite intense. China should not withdraw from the (great-power) competition in this region for the safety of China`s oil supply.”⁶⁸ So, purchases of assets and development of infrastructural projects are parts of Chinese strategies to secure its energy security and to prevent containment of further development.

China`s bilateral cooperation with Central Asian states is additionally reinforced by the SCO Energy Club.⁶⁹ We can regard this as the fact that energy security is highly ranked

63 Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China, *Hydrocarbons technology*, Available at: <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagas/>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

64 “In September 2011, CNPC and KazMunaiGas signed an agreement for construction of Line C of the pipeline in Uzbekistan. Construction of 1,840km long line C started in December 2011 and is expected to be completed by 2014. The Uzbekistan section of line C is 529km long and runs parallel to line A and B. It will have a capacity of 25bcm annually and will increase the total transmission capacity of the Central Asia-China pipeline to 55bcm annually.” Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, Turkmenistan to China, *Hydrocarbons technology*, Available at: <https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/centralasiachinagas/>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

65 “Construction of a fourth pipeline, Line D, is currently underway. It will connecting Beyneu on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to the central facility of Shymkent. From Shymkent the gas will be directed to Turpan in Xinjiang, China. Line D will provide China with an additional 15 billion cubic metres on top of the 55 billion it already imports from Turkmenistan.” “The Central Asian Gas Pipeline”, *South China Morning Post*, Available at: <http://multimedia.scmp.com/news/china/article/One-Belt-One-Road/gasPipeline.html>, (accessed on 13/10/2018) On section D, also, to see in, “Construction of Tajik section of Turkmenistan-China pipeline starts, says Tajik official”, *Media Group Tajikistan – Asia PLUS*, Available at: <https://www.news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/economic/20180131/construction-of-tajik-section-of-turkmenistan-china-gas-pipeline-starts-says-tajik-official>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)

66 Драгана Литровић, Драган Траиловић, „Геополитика кинеске енергетске стратегије у централној Азији”, *Српска политичка мисао*, број, 2, 2014, Институт за политичке студије, Београд, стр. 144.

67 Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, *Information Paper – Overseas investments by Chinese national oil companies*, International Energy Agency, February, 2011, pp. 40-42. In this paper you can find more information on purchases that China did in Central Asian region.

68 Ni Jianmin ed., *National Energy Security Report*, p. 149, quoted according to, Guo Xuetang, “Whether China`s Energy Strategy towards Central Eurasia”, *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2006, p. 132

69 Before the SCO Energy club was established, the question of energy was tackled during the summits of ministers of economy of the member states. According to Maryna V. Shavaliyova, “official contacts between the SCO member states in the field of energy began to develop in 2003, as a part of the working bodies of the SCO, which coordinated economic interests. The first document that regulated cooperation between the SCO nations in the economic sphere was the Programme for multilateral trade and economic cooperation of SCO member states, adopted on September 23, 2003. This document hardly mentions any cooperation in the energy sector. The Programme states: we will explore the potential for expanding mutually beneficial cooperation in the development of new deposits of hydrocarbons and their processing.” Maryna V. Shavaliyova, “Energy Cooperation and Competition within the SCO”, in Anatoliy A. Rozanov (ed.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia`s Security Challenges*, The Geneva Center for Democratic control of Armed Forces,

among SCO member states.⁷⁰

This Club was proposed by Russian president Vladimir Putin and welcomed by China's officials and strategists. For Russia establishment of this club is confirmation that she did not lose position in Central Asian region regarding energy sector and that she can still control the flow of oil and gas from this space. Furthermore, this can be understood as a new impetus to cordial and pragmatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, in sense that Beijing, still, admits Russian position as a dominant player in Central Asian region. For China, this club represents securing the routes of pipelines and sources in Central Asia. Namely, China in this way, additionally, secured existing, as well planned, pipelines from possible skirmishes among Central Asian states, as it was the case with the United Energy System of Central Asia. Although, China is trying, in partnership with Russia, to create stable security architecture, Central Asian states are divided in many lines.

Last year, 2017, Turkey chaired the SCO Energy club. This is big a diplomatic and geopolitical achievement of the SCO, because Turkey is one of the American choices in diminishing Russian energy leverage. For example, America is trying to develop Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. From American point of view this pipeline represents multiple and multi-layered choices for regional countries.⁷¹ According to Zhou Bo, honorary fellow to PLA-Academy of Military Science, granting chairmanship of the SCO Energy club to Turkey, represents the "goodwill of the SCO, because Turkey is the first non-full member state to become a chairman of a club in organization...for some Russian [Turkey] mirrors NATO's eastern expansion and they see Turkey as just a Trojan horse of NATO inside SCO."⁷² Giving Turkey this priority can be considered as attempt to widen international cooperation of the SCO. Simultaneously, it can be analyzed as success of the New Security Concept, because Russia and Turkey, following the period of cooperation, had an incident of crushed Russian warplane.⁷³ However, establishment of the SCO Energy club is important geostrategic move, also from the colossal richness in energy resources. The SCO member states "cover some 36 percent of the world's electricity, 23 percent of natural gas, 20.8 percent of crude oil and 60.2 percent of coal production. They also consume some 28 percent of natural gas, 25.2 percent of crude oil and 65.1 percent of coal."⁷⁴

Geneva, May, 2013, p. 57. Furthermore, with foundation of the SCO Business Council, energy security obtained new priority. For development of the SCO Energy Club, Xi'an Initiative is very important. More detailed on the Xi'an Initiative see in, Avaz Youldoshev, "Xi'an Initiative adopted to accelerate launch of SCO energy club", *Media Group Tajikistan – Asia PLUS*, Available at: <https://www.news.tj/en/news/xi-initiative-adopted-accelerate-launch-sco-energy-club>, (accessed on 16/10/2018)

70 According to the Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of State of the SCO signed on June 16, 2009, energy sector has the key role "in the successful economic development and creation of favorable preconditions for improving the living standards of their citizens, the SCO member states state their resolve to further advance mutually beneficial cooperation in this field on the basis of equality with the aim of ensuring effective, reliable and environmentally safe energy supplies." Yekaterinburg Declaration, 2009, Available at: <http://eng.sectsc.org/documents/>, (accessed on 11/10/2018)

71 More detailed on this in, Evan A. Feigenbaum, "Kazakhstan and the United States in a Changed World", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2006, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, p. 12.

72 Zhou Bo, "Could Turkey Serve as a Bridge Between NATO and SCO", *China-US Focus*, article has been published on December 19, 2006, Available at: <https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/could-turkey-serve-as-a-bridge-between-nato-and-sco>, (accessed on 13/10/2018)


73 More detailed on this in, "Putin condemns Turkey after Russian warplane downed near Syrian border", *The Guardian*, article has been published on November 24 2015, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/turkey-shoots-down-jet-near-border-with-syria>, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

74 "Turkey to chair 2017 Energy Club of Shanghai Cooperation Organization", *Daily Sabah*, article has been published on November 23, 2016, Available at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/11/23/turkey-to-chair-2017-energy-club-of-shanghai-coopera>

As we noticed, the majority of projects, bilateral or multilateral, that China develops in partnership are crossing Xinjiang. Despite Xinjiang`s geographical position, this is very important to stabilize this province and to give it economic stimulus. Reduction poverty among Uighurs people, according to Chinas official, can stiffen the blade of terrorism, because the roots of terrorism China finds in economic poverty. We can see that Central Asian region possesses both economic and strategic significance for China.

Geo-economic power is obvious tool within Chinese foreign policy, because China possesses tremendous amount of foreign exchange reserves.

Figure 1. China Foreign Exchange Reserves



The source of chart is the official site *Trading Economics*.⁷⁵

This chart indicates that, although China`s foreign exchange reserves fell as the consequence of new dynamics within international order and domestic restructuring, official Beijing still has enough resources to be geo-economic super power. In that sense "China is often correctly described as the world`s leading practitioner of geo-economics. It is also the major reason regional and global power projection has become such an economic (opposed to military) exercise."⁷⁶ Besides big banks (The Bank of China, The Industrial & Commercial Bank, The China Construction Bank, The Agriculture Bank of China, The China Development Bank, The Export-import Bank of China),⁷⁷ China established new international funds, corridors and banks, as an element of going out strategy and creating supportive environment. China established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This bank is result of China`s immense financial reserves and wish to inject them in world-wide projects. Officially, the Bank was "launched in Beijing in June 2015. The AIIB`s potential

tion-organization, (accessed on 13/10/2018) This also, in line with official statement of the SCO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliyev, "We do not want the Club to become a cartel, such as OPEC. This task is not set. The point is that given the important role played by the SCO states in the global energy balance, the potential role in energy security and reserves of the SCO countries (in terms of oil, gas, uranium and hydro resources), as well as the needs of the economic development of six states The initiative is quite natural." *Kazakhstan`s initiative of the Asian energy strategy does not contradict the idea of the SCO Energy Club – the Secretary General of the Shanghai Six*, ZAKON.KZ, Available at: <http://www.zakon.kz/99147-kazakhstanskaja-iniciativa-aziatskoj.html>, (accessed on 16/10/2018)

⁷⁵ *China Foreign Exchange Reserves*, Trading Economics, Available at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreign-exchange-reserves>, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

⁷⁶ James Reilly, "Goeconomics in Chinese Foreign Policy", in Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means – Geo-economics and Statecraft*, The Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, London, 2016, p. 93.

⁷⁷ More detailed on this banks in, J.B. Maverick, "The 4 Biggest Chinese Banks", *Investopedia*, Available at: <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/082015/4-biggest-chinese-banks.asp>, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

strength is noteworthy in the face of U.S. opposition since close U.S. allies have joined the new bank, including South Korea, Australia and the United Kingdom. Indeed, Japan and the United States are the most notable nonmembers. Beijing announced an initial \$40 billion investment in the AIIB, with India, Russia, and Germany also contributing to the bank's initial capitalization. China apparently will control more than 25% of the bank's votes.⁷⁸ Implementing projects through the AIIB, China facilitates infrastructural development of Asia and collaboration with other international funds, banks and financial organizations. Beside this, China launched the New Development Bank, Silk Road Fund, Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce.

The structural organization of the SCO gives us insights that further economic development and support of projects is secured. This is done by establishing, in 2006, the SCO Business council and the SCO Interbank Consortium. The first one is "an independent entity authorized to make advisory decisions and provide expert evaluations of the most promising activities that could promote closer involvement of the SCO business communities in the trade, economic and investment cooperation within the Organization."⁷⁹ The SCO Interbank Consortium and the Silk Road Fund "signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Basis of Partnership. According to the Memorandum, the Silk Road Fund and Interbank Consortium of SCO will jointly promote diversified investments in the SCO region to build an efficient and mutual beneficial framework for long-term cooperation."⁸⁰ We can see that the SCO has crucial importance for supporting BRI. Big impetus has been given to establishing of the SCO Development Bank. In 2010 China proposed creating the SCO Development Bank, as a first step towards the SCO free trade zone. Regarding the SCO Development Bank, although China pledge for it, no any spectacular progress has been made. For example, Liu Junmei, professor at the School of Economics, Fudan University, says that "Russia has always focused on security collaboration within the SCO. It doesn't want economic cooperation so much. And many member countries are worried that if a free trade zone were to be set up within the region, it could hurt their economic interests because their economic power is not strong as China's."⁸¹ We can see that China has to persuade, not to dissuade, its western neighbors that it will not represent the "yellow peril". Through policy and economic moves China has to demonstrate that the SCO, Shanghai spirit and the New Security Concept are in service for achieving economic development, social stability and that Central Asian states will be gateways, instead of shatterbelts.⁸²

Although economy is ranked very high on the SCO agenda which shows many signed documents on that subject, the SCO role in economic development has been questioned.⁸³ Namely, on May 8 2015, Chinese president Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir

78 More about gateways and shatter belts in, Bernard D. Cole, *China's Quest for Great Power*, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2016.

79 SCO Business council, Available at: <https://bcsc.org/en/sco-business-council>, accessed on 15/10/2018.

80 *Silk Road Fund and Interbank Consortium of the SCO Signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Basis of Partnership*, Silk Road Fund, Available at: <http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23809/23812/35424/index.html>, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

81 *SCO Development Bank: Prospects of the SCO development bank*, CGTN, article has been published on June 6 2018, Available at: https://news.cgtn.com/news/7a517a4d32454464776c6d636a4e6e62684a4856/share_p.html, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

82 More detailed on these concepts to see in, Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics – The Geography of International Relations*, ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD, New York, 2008.

83 For example during the summit in Qingdao, Heads of States signed *Joint Communiqué of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Simplifying Trade Procedures*.

Putin had a very important meeting. During that meeting, Chinese and Russian presidents pledged to integrate the BRI and Eurasia Economic Union under the auspices of the SCO.⁸⁴ That could be strong signal that China is on the right way to create free trade zone, to boost further trade cooperation, to develop BRI and to enhance its economic position among Central Asian states. However, the primal plan has been changed. According to Anson Sidle, “with the recent conclusion of a free trade agreement between the EAEU and Beijing, Moscow and Beijing’s plans are finally translating into reality—but without the direction of the SCO. Now the SCO is neither a tight-knit security organization, nor a bridge between superpowers, but a glorified talk shop. Unwilling to let go of its dominance in Central Asia, but unable to compete with Beijing economically, Moscow behaved increasingly as spoiler, throwing a wrench in Beijing’s initiatives whenever possible. When Beijing pushed for an SCO development bank and a free-trade zone starting in 2010, Moscow flatly rejected the idea of a free-trade zone and scuttled plans for a joint development bank by proposing alternatives it knew Beijing would reject.”⁸⁵ Besides this central Asian States record trade deficit with China. The only exception of this trend is Turkmenistan. Little paradoxically, Turkmenistan, as we know, is not member nation of the SCO.⁸⁶

4. Conclusion

Creating this kind of organization, China followed “internationalization of domestic security and domestication of international security.”⁸⁷ China became more open, but at the same time more proactive in resolving international security issues, especially in recent time regarding cyber security. Simultaneously, official Beijing showed that economy, development and security are intertwined. China is aware of its new position in the international order acquired by tremendous financial reserves, proactive diplomacy and new thinking in security area. According to Yong Deng “a state’s power position in the international system defines its strategic situation and is in itself an integral part of the state’s strategic thinking.”⁸⁸ In line with that China triggered many foreign initiatives, and many economic corridors with BRI as umbrella project. This project questioned the strategy of containment because China became highly sophisticated state in terms of technology, economically integrated with international trends, additionally reinforced by size of its market and diplomatically assertive country.

Also China announced that “it will become a leader and supporter of the developing world. China’s vote in the United Nations will always belong to developing countries, and it will

84 More detailed on this in, “China, Russia agree to integrate the Belt initiative with EAEU construction”, *Xinhua news*, article has been published on May 9 2015, Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2015-05/09/c_134222936_2.htm, (accessed on 15/10/2018)

85 Anson Sidle, “Why the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Fails”, *The National Interest*, the article has been published on September 2 2018, Available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-shanghai-cooperation-organization-fails-30197>, (accessed on 10/04/2018)

86 About trade deficit of Central Asia with China in, *China`s Statistical Year Book 2017*, National Bureau of Statistics of China, Available at: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2017/html/EN1105.jpg>, (accessed on 26/10/2018)

87 Stephen Blank, “Kazakhstan`s Border Relations with China”, Bruce A. Elleman, Stephen Kotkin, Clive Schofield, *Beijing`s Power and China`s Borders*, Armonk, New York, 2012, p. 100.

88 Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3, 2001, p. 343,

solemnly announce China's new initiatives to support the cause of the United Nations."⁸⁹ Launching the SCO, but as well many other foreign initiatives, China showed that it possesses the strategy towards developing world which is not merely "a part of a broader strategy toward the superpowers and the larger world."⁹⁰ Also China showed that possesses enough economic resources. Without financial reserves, China's international positioning would not be possible.

Although the officials of the SCO accentuate that this Organization is not anti-western bloc, at the same time we cannot say that is pro-western. It represents strategic thinking for obtaining leverage in creating stable security architecture. As Joel Wuthnow notices "U.S. officials have often downplayed the significance of these activities or even applauded China's willingness to shoulder more regional security burdens."⁹¹ From the reason that SCO stems from another system of values, it has been stereotyped as a "club of dictators", "Asian NATO", Organization that diminish the value of human rights, anti-American organization, Chinese charm offensive.⁹² However, the SCO is serving purpose, boosting trust and cooperation in trade, energy, technology, people-to-people, between China and Central Asian states and Russia. At the same time, the SCO is promoting international and mutual cooperation regarding security issues, development of multilateralism, diminishing post and Cold War mentality. China through the SCO is building national image not just in Central Asian region, as well on the international level. But, will China use this Organization and economic dependence of weaker states to request political concessions, as it did with Philippines, South Korea, etc.

At this moment, multilateralism is inseparable from new Chinese diplomacy. Gathering countries in clusters, without alliance obligations is confirmation that official Beijing is promoting open regionalism, based on the practical goals and purposes.

New Security Concept and its implementation through the SCO is multi-vector and multi-layered strategy. As we can see two main pillars are security and economy, but with including areas such as sport, health, people-to-people exchange, culture. Infrastructure is very important of Chinese positioning within Central Asian region. From Chinese point of view interconnectivity is the main feature for economic and social development of one state. Anyway trade is still in the process of increasing, and it is quite obvious that BRI is representing new possibilities. Furthermore, the importance of the SCO for the security architecture, trade relations, Silk Road Economic Belt, Xinjiang issue, preventing the spillover effects of the `Golden Crescent` and Chinese march towards west. We have to be very patient and to see what will be the role of the SCO, especially now when full members are India and

89 国防大学教授纪明葵：中国在国际社会彰显自信 (Ji Mingkui, a professor at the National Defense University: China shows confidence in the international community/Guófáng dàxué jiàoshòu Jì Míngkuí: Zhōngguó zài guójì shèhuì zhāngxī n zìxìn), the article has been published on October 4, 2015, Available at: http://www.cssn.cn/dzyx/dzyx_lsj/201510/t20151004_2483408.shtml, (accessed on 24.10.2018.)

90 Nathan, Andrew J., AND Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Security*, New York, Columbian University Press, 2012, p. 14, in Andrew Scobell et al (eds.), *At the Down of Belt and Road*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2018, p. 12.

91 Joel Wuthnow, "U.S. `Minilateralism` in Asia and China's Responses: A New Security Dilemma", *Journal of Contemporary China*, Published online on July 17, 2018, p.5.

92 About naming of the SCO, see in, Драгана Митровић, „ШОС – проблеми и перспективе развоја“, *Српска политичка мисао*, број 3-4, Институт за политичке студије, Београд. Драгана Митровић, Шангајска организација за сарадњу – настанак, циљеви и дometи нове безбедносно-еконсомке структуре Азије, *Српска политичка мисао*, број 1-2, Институт за политичке студије, Београд.

Pakistan. "Can we expect new widening in format SCO + 3 (USA, EU, Japan)? Japanese scientist Iwashita Akihiro, to create ad hoc status at the summit, perhaps with a "Guest" status and in the framework of SCO; Pre-summit interactions: for example, establishing a "SCO Plus Alpha" format; from a "Guest" toward a "Partner." The framework could be laid out in the form of the SCO plus Three (EU, U.S., Japan), the SCO Regional Forum and so on."⁹³

However, we can see that the SCO is very important for domestic and foreign security of China. Simultaneously, the SCO has importance in Chinese attempts to create an image, geopolitical and geo-economic, in Central Asia as responsible power which offers myriad of possibilities.

⁹³ Mirzokhid Rakhimov, "Central Asia and Japan: Bilateral and Multilateral Relations", *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 5, 2014, p. 85. Also about this in, Iwashita Akihiro, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Beyond a Miscalculation on Power Games", in, Christopher Len et al (eds.), *Japan`s Silk Road Diplomacy – Paving the Road Ahead*, Central Asia – Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, USA, 2008.

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Слободан Поповић

Улога Шангајске организације за сарадњу у новом безбедносном концепту НР Кине

Апстракт

Методом анализе садржаја, ми ћемо истражити позицију Шангајске организације за сарадњу, у оквиру Новог концепта безбедности и мултилатерализма базираног на истом. Промовисање новог начина разумевања безбедности је потврда да званични Пекинг заузима активан, те и конструктиван став у креирању подстицајног окружења како би реализовао националне циљеве. Први део рада ће истраживати промене које су настале у кинеском разумевању појма безбедности. Ово ће нам бити од користи када будемо анализирали зашто је Народна Република Кина (Кина) кренула, поред билатералних, да практикује и мултилатералне канале комуницирања. Симултано, те промене нам указују како Кина схвата позицију у међународном систему и односе са другим државама. Други део рада ће бити посвећен институционалном развоју ШОС-а. Анализирајући институционално, логистичко и кадровско проширење Организације, ми ћемо увидети које су циљеве државе чланице желеле да реализују. У истом делу рада ми ћемо објективно представити конкретне стратешке потезе које је Кина учинила или подржала путем ШОС-а, са циљем стабилизације централноазијског простора. Стабилно окружење је преко потребно и из безбедносних и из економских разлога.

Кључне речи: Нови концепт безбедности, економија, Шангајска Организација за сарадњу, мултилатерализам, Централна Азија, Кина, национални интереси