

Gerd Kaminski*

Tianxia and Chinese Foreign Policy**

Abstract

Increasing power and self-confidence plus rising nationalism have been responsible for the development of the sino-centric Tianxia School. The vanguards of this school are Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong. Tianxiaguan – Tianxiaism challenges the classical Western rules of international relations and peace – keeping by offering a Chinese pattern which is based on the experiences of Zhou Dynasty and the later tributary state system. This group of Chinese scholars believes that the Tianxia model would be more successful than the United Nations. After much attention during the start of the school and some commitments to the principles of Tianxia thinking during the first years of Xi Jinping's administration the influence of the school seems to be fading and a return to Deng Xiaoping's cautious foreign policy rather likely.

Keywords: *Tianxia, Tianxiaism, Zhao Tingyang, Yan Xuetong, Zhou Dynasty, Tributary State System, China – Centrism, Confucianism, Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping*

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In 1988 the Austrian magazine *China Report* edited by me published an article by Prof. Zhang Qingxiong from Fudan University with the headline: "Chinese Tradition and its Confrontation with Western Civilization."¹ He explained that the scholars of that time were split in two camps: "One camp believes that the Chinese Society on long term does not make substantial progress which is due to the stagnant character of Chinese philosophy. In order of injecting vitality into Chinese society it would be necessary to introduce philosophical thinking from the West. The other camp on the contrary is convinced that Western philosophy goes to unharmonious extremes."

Nurtured by increasing power², growing confidence and the complementary to China's rising nationalism³, the camp favoring traditional Chinese values seemed to get the upper hand in the first decade of the 21st century. Chinese scholars like Li Yunlong from the Party School joined the ranks of those who demanded – contrary to the 4th of May Movement

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1 G. Kaminski (ed.), *China Report* 1987/88, no 97-98, pp. 44-50

2 G. Kaminski, "Xi Jinping's Chinesischer Traum und die chinesische Außenpolitik", in G. Kaminski (ed), *Wen versus Wu: Streit und Streitschlichtung, Krieg und Frieden in der chinesischen Tradition und Gegenwart*, Vienna, 2016, pp. 216-259

3 Y. Guo (ed.), *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China*, New York, 2009, pp. 17-113

and a long time practice of the CCP⁴ – a re-assessment of Confucius: “The process of building China’s socialist new culture is also one that we strive to preserve and carry forward the essence of Confucian thoughts give them new contents and resume their vigor and vitality.”⁵

In the framework of “Anti-West Cultural Nationalism” as Pang Qin has put it, zealots like Li Xiguang and Liu Kang claimed that the Western countries intended to turn China into something like Mexico or India. Guan Shijie, Director of the International and Intercultural Communication Program at Beijing University, as early as in the nineties was the herald of a slogan which seems to have become mainstream in this century: “Time has come for the West to learn from the East.”⁶

In 21st century Confucianism changed from pure academic discussions into practice and everyday life.⁷ The Neoconfucianists took Confucianism to hammer a weapon against unfortunate Western influence.

Pang Qin believes that this reshuffling of Chinese outlook to the situation in China and abroad can be explained by Huntington’s theory on “modernization and cultural resurgence.” Westernization, in its early phase, promotes modernization. In its later phases “modernization enhances the economic, military and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to be culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomies as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which traditional culture may provide an answer.”⁸

During the first decade of the 21st century not few of the Chinese experts started to believe that China should move out of the shadow of humbleness with the aim of grasping global leadership.⁹ The question is how?

The question “how?” was answered by a not too big but influential group of scholars based at China’s Elite – Tsinghua University. Their argument is that the kings of Western Zhou Dynasty (II. Century – 771 B.C.) after the overturn of Shang Dynasty came from a tribe less powerful than the other tribes which had united in a coalition for fighting against the last Shang King. Their argument is that the Zhou King substituted power by

4 G. Kaminski, “Traditional Elements in Xi Jinping’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era”, in G. Kaminski (ed.), *Chinese Strategies*, Vienna, 2019, pp 20-27

5 Y. Li and Z. Qian, *Confucian Culture and Human Rights Development*, 2014, Available at: http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/2014/PAPERS_1030/986.html (accessed 1 February 2019)

6 Q. Pang, “The rise of cultural nationalism in contemporary china: the main content and causes”, *Elixir Social Science*, no. 36, 2011, p. 3362

7 J. Wang, G. Kaminski, R. Trappl, *Konfuzius, Mensch, Macht und Mythos*, Vienna, 2013; J. S. Rošker, *Modern Confucianism and Chinese Theories of Modernisation*; J. Wang, *Die öffentliche Präsenz von Konfuzius in China*, pp. 37-62; O. Weggel, *Der Konfuzianismus als Antipode der westlichen Gesellschaftsordnung*, pp. 71-94.

8 Q. Pang, op.cit, p. 3364

9 S. Mokry, ‘Decoding Chinese Concepts for the Global Order’, *Merics China Monitor*, October 4th, 2018, Available at: https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/181008_MERICS_ChinaMonitor_Foreign_Policy.pdf, p.8, (accessed 1 February 2019); B. Hückel, ‘Theory of International Relations with Chinese Characteristics’, *diskurs-zeitschrift [website]*, No.2, 2012, Available at: <http://www.diskurs-zeitschrift.de/theory-of-international-relations-with-chinese-characteristics-the-tian-xia-system-from-a-metatheoretical-perspective/>, p. 39, (accessed 1 February 2019);

virtue which enabled him to provide peace and harmony thus securing stability for China = *Tianxia* ("all under heaven", official name for the Chinese empire till the fall of the dynasty 1911, that means for the whole world.) They further argued that after that unification of China in 221 BC, the Chinese emperor was ruling China and the vassal states like a benevolent father. Due to China's highly developed civilization and the virtue of the Chinese emperor the rulers of the tributary states did come by their own free will for subduing to the central ruler. According to the *Tianxia* School China was able to secure peace and prosperity for all till the bellicose Western imperialist powers destroyed this peaceful cosmos guided by virtue and wisdom.

Among the scholars of the *Tianxia* group School Prof. Zhao Tingyang with his *Tianxia* studies starting at the nineties has been in a vanguard position. According to Zhang Feng three features characterize the *Tianxia* approach:¹⁰

"First, its motivation originates in a desire to enrich modern IR theory and, no less importantly, to draw policy lessons for China's rise today. Second, it seeks to do so by drawing on China's political thought from the golden age of Chinese philosophy in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States period (770-222 BC). [...] trespassing on the subfield of International Political Theory (which, it must be pointed out in the present context, is almost entirely Eurocentric)."

Zhao Tingyang published his book *Tianxia Tixi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun* (The *Tianxia* System: An Introduction to the Philosophy of a World Institution) in 2005. This book was a bestseller in China and drew much attention, same when an English edition was published in the USA by Princeton University Press. William A. Callahan believes that Zhao's book was a breakthrough in moving the existing debate on *Tianxia* into the focus of political discussion.¹¹ "Although Chinese scholars have been employing traditional concepts – including *Tianxia* – to explain current domestic and foreign policies for more than a decade, Zhao's plan for a Chinese– inspired world utopia provides an exemplary case of the workings of normative policymaking because it dramatically shifted these discussions from the margins to the mainstream. The popularity of Zhao's very singular understanding of *Tianxia* thus powerfully demonstrates a broader trend that will outlive the considerable impact of his particular book: 'Chinese-style IR' has become a topic of conversation not just among public intellectuals and IR scholars but also in the much broader arenas of popular culture and state policy as a sort of patriotic cosmopolitanism."

According to Zhao, the other countries could freely decide whether they would join the tributary state system headed by the Chinese emperor. In this connection Zhao interprets the Confucian term *ren* (to love other human beings) with the meaning of 1000 hearts.

He supposes that the Chinese *Tianxia* System was successful because the Chinese Em-

10 F. Zhang, "The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of international relations", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 5, 2012, p. 75

11 W. A. Callahan, "Tianxia, Empire and the World: Chinese Visions of World Order for the 21st Century", W.A. Callahan, E. Barabantseva (ed.), *China orders the world: Normative Foreign Policy*, Washington, 2011, p. 92

peror has been able to win the hearts of other people.¹² -- He who is benevolent has no enemies!¹³ It is interesting to note that Yu Dan who has won much fame by making Confucianism popular on TV and selling more than ten millions copies of her book on the Analects of Confucius pays much attention as well to this kind of ancient heart symbolism. Like Zhao Tingyang she puts the heart in the center of her Confucian presentations. At UNESCO in Paris she kicked off an international contest for designers focusing on 'xin', the Chinese character for "heart".¹⁴

Zhao Tingyang believes that other states including the USA could learn from this kind of benign and moral leadership. He is also convinced that his *Tianxia* would work better than the system of the UN.

"The UN has made great efforts to validate rational dialogue to replace conflict. There is no doubt that rational dialogue has had an impact in reducing wars and fighting, but not in conflict reduction, and instead has encouraged the strategic game of non-cooperation, thus universally enhancing the personality of the selfish maximizer. And, worse, the United Nations has no power to stop a superpower from universalizing itself alone in name of globalization. The UN is more of a political market for nations and less of an institution for the world itself."¹⁵

Zhao explains how *Tianxia* outranks the order of the Roman and British Empire and USA hegemonism. Rome was an expansionist superpower, the British Empire a mixture of nationalism, imperialism and colonialism and the USA in fact is camouflaged Neo-Imperialism. *Tianxia* would unite the hearts of all people with politics and the world:

"Our globe needs a world theory, rather than an international theory, to speak for the world. And the theory of All-under-Heaven as a world theory could provide a better view for political philosophy and political science."¹⁶

Feng Zhang, Zhao's colleague at Tsinghua University, pointed out:

"this philosophical theory of international relations has had a huge impact on China's community of international relations scholars, stirring up excitement as well as curiosity. This is due, in part, to the fact that Chinese scholars in this field have not been able to produce a theory as sophisticated as this..."¹⁷

Zhao's views were supported in certain points by Qin Yaqing, Vice-President of Chinese Foreign Affairs University. He recalls the interpretation of *Tianxia* by John K. Fairbank:

"Fairbank thus discusses the important differences between the traditional Chinese world

12 T. Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven'". Callahan, Barabantseva, 2011, p. 28

13 X. Yan, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, Princeton 2011, p.180

14 Yu Dan, interviewed by Gerd Kaminski in Vienna on Nov. 11th 2018

15 T. Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from the Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven'". Callahan, Barabantseva, 2011, p. 30-31, 32ff.

16 T. Zhao, op.cit, p. 32ff.

17 Z. Feng, *The Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia*, Reviewed by Z. Feng, *Global Asia Book Review*, p. 108

view and the Western view of the international system; in China the world is a holistic unit that is based on order, rather than Hobbesian culture's battlefield of nation-states. Accordingly, the *Tianxia* system is not a Hobbesian culture because the units do not fight with each other; it is not a Lockean culture because units do not compete with each other and it is not a Kantian culture because units do not relate as equal friends."¹⁸

In a similar way like Zhao Tingyang, Yan Xuetong, director of Tsinghua's Institute of International Studies looks into the Chinese past for solutions in regard of modern Chinese foreign policy. In the preface of his book "Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power"¹⁹ Yan mentions a meeting with Henry Kissinger in 2008:

"During a conversation in Beijing in 2008, Dr. Henry Kissinger told me he believed that – when China became a strong world power – the Chinese government would adopt ancient Chinese philosophy rather than Marxism or Liberalism to guide its foreign policy."²⁰

Yan himself points to the great echo his book gained nationally and internationally:

"By the end of 2012, the book seems to have struck a chord in different disciplines and in different countries. The Photo of United States Vice-President Joe Biden holding this book in Chengdu Airport, China, in August 2011 reflects the book's attractiveness to politicians. The New York Times commissioned and published my article linking the core idea of this book with China-United States relations in late 2011, and it turned out to be one of the top ten most emailed articles the day it appeared. Finally, the World Economic Forum's annual 2012 meeting in Davos held a special session on this book"²¹

Yan stresses that the *Tianxia* concept has already been introduced in the late 19th century by the important reformer Liang Qichao. *Tianxia* forms a moral authority. For China's rise it would be of great importance to study the Chinese classical philosophers. Only by moral conduct would it be possible to rule the world. For achieving this aim military power could be neglected:

"The superior morality of King Tang of the Shang and King Wu of the Zhou were such that they could attain leadership of all under heaven based on the small cities of Bo and Hao, respectively. The religious authority of the Vatican is rather like what Xunzi says about humane authority. The territory of the Vatican is even smaller than that of Singapore and its economic might is not as great as Singapore's. Moreover, it has no army. Nevertheless, the Vatican's authority in world affairs is far beyond Singapore's. This example can help us to understand why Xunzi thinks that morality is the foundation for attaining leadership under heaven."

Xunzi thinks that people who possess humane authority do so because they implement moral norms. Speaking of the sage king, he says:

¹⁸ Y. Qin, 'The Possibility and heritability of a Chinese School of International Relations Theory', Callahan/Barabantseva 2011, p. 42f.

¹⁹ X. Yan, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, Princeton, 2011

²⁰ X. Yan, *op.cit.*, p. 11

²¹ X. Yan, *op.cit.*, p. 11

"Unlike others, his benevolence stretches to all under heaven; his justice to all under heaven; his authority to all under heaven. Since his benevolence stretches to all under heaven, there is no one in all under heaven who does not love him. Since his justice stretches to all under heaven, there is no one in all under heaven who does not respect him. Since his authority stretches to all under heaven, there is no one in all under heaven who dares oppose him. Relying on the authority of invincibility and a policy of winning people's support, one can win victories without wars, acquire without attacking. Troops in armor are not sent out and yet all under heaven submits. This is the man who knows the humane way of leadership."²²

Nele Noesselt summarizes Zhao's and Yan's approaches like this:

"Yan's concept melts China's proclamation regarding a "harmonious world" and "peaceful rise" which have so far been classified as political slogans with "conceptual pillars of an alternative model of the international system that could serve as a blueprint for other state actors."²³

"Zhao Tingyang's system is characterized by harmony and diversity, and cooperation between different civilizations and sociopolitical systems. Zhao Tingyang's configuration of the *Tianxia* in the context of the twenty-first century is not limited to the tributary system, which served as the 'operational foundation' over hundreds of years, instead it upgrades the *Tianxia* from a regional institutional framework to an abstract global model."²⁴

Another representative of Tsinghua University's *Tianxia* School is Prof. Qian Xun. I interviewed him at International Confucius Society in Beijing in 2011, he told me:

"Harmony as a principle of international order goes back to the principles of Zhou Dynasty. If soft power is well applied it is natural to attain influence on other countries. If China is successful in being better than others in the world community they will be willing to learn from China. This is different from a hegemonist state who forces his ideas on other states. Mongolians and Manchus were happy to learn from Chinese culture. If a state is strong he can influence others. Each nation has its own culture. We welcome to learn from us."

A scholar who up to a certain extent could be counted among the "*Tianxia*-ists" is Prof. Qin Yaqing who holds the position of President of China Foreign Affairs University which is a unit of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Qin Yaqing in his books and essays pays attention to Zhao Tingyang whom he identifies as the most important representative of the *Tianxia* School. According to Qin "Three views are particularly significant in Zhao's theory: the *Tianxia* system created by the Chinese practice, its ordering principle of family ties, and its inspirational potential to develop a genuine global system for today's world."²⁵

22 X. Yan, *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, Princeton, 2011, p. 87

23 N. Noesselt, "Is there a Chinese School of IR?", *Giga Working Papers*, No. 188, March 2012, p. 18

24 N. Noesselt, op.cit, p. 20

25 Y. Qin, "Cultural and global thought: Chinese international theory in the making", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no 100, 2012, p. 70

Qin agrees to Zhao's argument that "the Zhou Dynasty succeeded in maintaining legitimacy, order, and peace because it established an all – under – heaven system (*Tianxia*), a universal system inclusive of all nations, and a world of, and for all peoples."²⁶

Qin identifies shortcomings of the *Tianxia* System of Zhou Dynasty and later after the unification of China 221 BC the *Tianxia* System of tributary states with the Chinese Emperor in the center but he also stresses the merits of the system.

"The Tributary System, based upon the *Tianxia* philosophy, is a system of inequality. This is the part that goes against human desire for equal recognition and it is perhaps the most important cause for the collapse of the Tributary System when it clashed with the Westphalian one. However, there are some other important ideas and practices in this system as well as in the philosophy that may be quite positive. The first is the holist approach. Since *Tianxia* was a combined whole, the concept of the subjectivity, or the subjective 'I', was not conspicuous at all and therefore there existed no dichotomy of the self and the other (Feng, 1991). As a result, in the Chinese mind, there could be something far away in time and space, but there was never something that was opposite, intolerant, and needed conquering. The far-away was indeed an extension of the self, like great grandfather and the great grandsons in the temporal framework or the center of a ripple and its gradually spreading circles in the spatial framework. This holist worldview is different from the Western dualistic view of the two opposites, where an inevitable conflict is implied."^{27,26a}

But Qin disagrees with Yan's sino-centric ambitions and offers his own system relating *Tianxia*, Yin-Yang and Western rationality in his own concept of "Relation Governance."²⁸

"For he and his colleagues have tried to find how to use ancient Chinese ideas to make up for the inadequacies of the American IR theory, especially in the key concepts such as power. By this logic, they champion a hierarchical international system, study strategies for seeking to attain hegemony, and offer prescriptions for China's rise. I am more complementary. I have developed a general theory on relationality, which is the pivotal concept in Chinese society, developed over millennia, and practiced by generations, just as rationality is in Western societies. Furthermore, since the nature of the meta-relationship (or the relation between *yin* and *yang*) is considered to be harmonious, ideas and values from different cultures and civilizations, like streams of water from different sources."

In his book "A Relational Theory of World Politics" published also in 2012 Qin on one hand defends Zhao Tingyang against attacks from Western scholars:

"In IR, for example, the practice and performance in the Westphalian international sys-

26 Y. Qin, *op.cit.*, p. 71

27 Y. Qin, "Why is there No Chinese International Relations Theory?", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 7, Issue 3, September 2007, p. 313–340

28 Y. Qin, "Cultural and global thought: Chinese international theory in the making", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no 100, 2012, p. 85

tem differs significantly from the practice and performance of the Chinese tribute international system. IR theories with a theoretical hard core cultivated by the Westphalian practices may not explain and interpret well phenomena in the tribute system".²⁹

On the other hand he finds fault with Zhao's overdone evaluation of collectivity:³⁰

"I do not, however, agree with Zhao on the argument that coexistence comes before existence in the social world. If we follow such an order of ranking, we tend to believe that, existence is conditioned on coexistence.

It is not only misleading, but also tends to justify dictatorship or collective violence which suppresses legitimate self-interest in the name of the state or of any other collectivity..."

Qin calls Confucian societies relationship societies. "In such societies the self is a rational self (which comes near to the Western rational approach) ... intensely aware of the social presence of other human beings" (Confucian approach).³¹

Two years later in his essay "Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China's International Strategy" Qin pointed out that Zhao's interpretation of *Tianxia* would seduce new Chinese leaders to adapt a line of foreign policy of "intensifying irreconcilable competition for global leadership with the established hegemon – the United States – in an anarchic world."³²

We owe another model of *Tianxia* to Prof. Xu Jilin with still more pheralistic pattern which at the same time is criticizing other scholars and leaders overshooting in paying tribute to ancient dominant China centrism.³³

Prof. Xu Jilin offers in his "New *Tianxia*" an alternative model of world order. Like the Tsinghua School his concept roots in Chinese history but in contrast his "New *Tianxia*" is de-centered and non-hierarchical. Xu turns against Chinese "nationalism and statism" which "have risen to tremendous heights". According to Xi *Tianxia* never belonged to China alone.³⁴ He ridicules those who oppose the "sin of learning from the West" and propose "everything is good if it comes from China." Those extremists have misunderstood the real meaning of Chinese universalism.³⁵

Hierarchical *Tianxia* is "reactionary and wishful thinking."³⁶ Xu pleads for developing a "New *Tianxia*"³⁷:

29 Y. Qin, *A Relational Theory of World Politics*, (first published 2012), New York, 2018, pp.48-49

30 Y. Qin, *op.cit.*, pp. 127-128

31 Y. Qin, *A Relational Theory of World Politics*, (first published 2012), New York, 2018, p. 129

32 Y. Qin, "Continuity through Change: Background knowledge and China's International Strategy", *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol 7, no.3, 2014, p. 301

33 J. Xu, "The New *Tianxia*" [website], 2018, <https://u.osu.edu/mclc/2018/10/18/xu-jilin-the-new-Tianxia/>

34 J. Xu, *The New Tianxia: Rebuilding China's Internal and External Order*, p. 3

35 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 5

36 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 6

37 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 7

“What is ‘new’ about the new *Tianxia*? In comparison with the traditional concept, its novelty is expressed in two dimensions: one, its de-centered and non-hierarchical nature; two, its ability to create a new sense of universality. Traditional *Tianxia* was a hierarchical concentric politico-civilizational order with China as its core. What the new *Tianxia* should discard first is precisely this centralized and hierarchical order. What is ‘new’ about the new *Tianxia* is the addition of the principle of the equality of nation-states. In the new *Tianxia* order, there is no center, there are only independent and peaceful peoples and states who respect one another. Nor will there be a hierarchical arrangement of power in terms of domination and enslavement, protection and submission; instead it will be a peaceful order of egalitarian co-existence, one that spurns authority and domination. Even more important is that the subject of the new *Tianxia* order has already undergone a transformation: there is no longer a distinction between Chinese and barbarian, nor between subject and object. Instead it will be something like what the ancients said: ‘*Tianxia* is the *Tianxia* of *Tianxia* people.’ In the internal order of the new *Tianxia*, Han people and the various national minorities will enjoy mutual equality in legal and status terms, and the cultural uniqueness and pluralism of the different nationalities will be respected and protected. And in the international, external order, China’s relations with its neighbors and indeed every nation in the world, regardless of whether they are great or small nations, will be defined by the principles of respect for each other’s sovereign independence, equality in their treatment of each other, and peaceful co-existence.”

New *Tianxia* is the return to the ideal of the superior man. “The superior man acts in harmony with others but does not seek to be like them. The different value systems and material pursuits of various civilizations and cultures are accommodated in the same world using harmonious methods, sharing the most basic consensus regarding mutual values.”³⁸ New *Tianxia* means unity in diversity.

Xu scourges not only other scholars but also criticizes weak points of Chinese foreign policy. He claims that under prevailing circumstances:

“China’s original imperial character not only will not disappear, but in fact will grow stronger. Why is that even as China repeatedly states that its rise is peaceful it cannot convince its neighbours? One important reason is that within China’s terrifying imperial body lurks a frightening soul that values national supremacy above all else an empire without consciousness of *Tianxia*.”³⁹

Xu mentions the haughty character of Chinese statements on the international floor:⁴⁰

“The spokespeople for China’s foreign ministry often use the following phrases to express China’s national will: ‘This is a domestic political matter, we do not permit foreigners to

38 J. Xu, *The New Tianxia: Rebuilding China’s Internal and External Order*, p. 9

39 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 18

40 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 19

meddle;' or 'This regards China's sovereignty and core interests, how can we permit foreign countries to intervene?' In an international society that has already established measures of universal value, China remains a stranger to the discourse of universal civilization, and protects herself through the rigid discourse of national sovereignty. The traditional Chinese empire attracted many countries to its court over the years not because neighboring countries feared the empire's military force, but because they were attracted by its advanced civilization and institutions. This kind of civilizational attraction is precisely what is meant by a country's soft power."

Xu believes that the regime's new political and military assertiveness cannot be related with the real nature of the former tributary system.⁴¹

"The Chinese empire of the past had friends everywhere, yet today rising China has enemies all around. Some hawks in the military have even complained that 'China is surrounded on all sides.' Whether these enemies are real or imagined remains to be seen, but what is clear is that the form of thinking that places national supremacy above all easily creates enemies, even where there aren't any... In the past Mao Zedong proudly proclaimed that 'we have friends all over the world'. Yet today's China is just the opposite: 'We have enemies all over the world'."

Xu blames those who wrongly interpret Deng Xiaoping's guiding principles for foreign policy:⁴²

"In the proposal that Deng Xiaoping offered in the 1980s to resolve the Diaoyutai Island (known as Senkaku in Japanese) dispute, 'Avoid Conflict, Collectively Develop,' we see the intelligence of traditional *Tianxia* playing an important role in contemporary international society. Yet to the present day, people only pay attention to the strategic meaning of the proposal. They lack an understanding of the Eastern wisdom that lies behind it, an intelligence that provides new principles for dealing with rules of the international games that are played in the ocean."

Xu concludes his essay by calling upon discarding the old *Tianxia* which should not serve to create world order by Chinese supremacy but pleads for a new *Tianxia* on basis of equality and multi-state-system.⁴³

41 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 20-21

42 J. Xu, *op.cit.*, p. 22

43 "The new *Tianxia* emerges from the historical wisdom of pre-modern China, discarding and de-centering traditional *Tianxia*. Rejecting hierarchy and placing mutually-shared equality at its core, it attempts to establish a new and 'commonly shared' universalism. Historical *Tianxia* used imperial methods of governance to serve as its institutional body. Traditional empire is different from the modern nation state, which seeks to homogenize and incorporate all into a single system... The traditional empire's *Tianxia* wisdom can provide us insights today in the following ways: the overly singular and uniform logic of the nation-state cannot, internally, resolve the minority issues in the border regions, while externally it is not helpful in easing conflicts over political sovereignty with neighboring countries. To the unified logic of the nation-state should be added the flexible diversity and multiple-systems of empire, providing balance. In sum, in the core regions of China, 'one system, different models' should be implemented; in the border regions, 'one nation, different cultures' should be realized; in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, 'one civilization, different systems' should be experimented with; in East Asian society, 'one region, different interests' should be recognized; in international society, 'one world, different civilizations' should be constructed. In this way, the internal and external order of the new *Tianxia* can be established, creating the conditions for the mutual co-existence, indeed the mutual benefit, not only for all of China's domestic ethnicities but for all East Asia's nations, creating a new universalism for a future world order." J. Xu, *The New Tianxia: Rebuilding China's Internal and External Order*, p. 28

It is interesting to observe that Confucian “*Tianxiaism*” has not been limited to the Chinese mainland, we can also see its impact on scholars in Taiwan and even Chinese scholars oversea. Shih Chih-yu from National Taiwan University is focusing on this new development.⁴⁴

“The nascent attention to the Confucian notion of all under heaven suggests an alternative. This alternative has an even stronger potential of expanding the China-centric circle because ‘all under heaven’ has its origin in pre-1949 historiography, hence a potential realignment with China scholars in Hong Kong and Taiwan. At a time Euro-centrism in Taiwan loses intellectual productivity due to repeated re-appropriation that reduces it to no more than a matter of political technicality, Confucianism could be attractive. Confucianism’s cultural sensibility may further facilitate a non-Euro-centric realignment with other East Asian China experts in Japan and Korea who increasingly conceive of Confucianism respectively as their forefathers’ legacy. Most importantly perhaps is that when realignment of this sort alerts Western China watchers, who typically considers Confucianism a disguise of soft power, and yet adherence to Confucianism does not lead to any deliberate response, then a non-Euro-centrism that does not target Euro-centrism may eventually come into being.”

Shih believes that “Confucianism, among most other Chinese classics, was already quasi- IR theory in its time, to the extent that it began as a philosophy to rescue the All-under-Heaven order from decaying into a warring system among kingdoms.”⁴⁵

A lot of other Taiwanese scholars like Chang Chi-hsiung have offered in-depth studies on the Chinese *Tianxia* world order and the tributary state system.⁴⁶

“In this, World Community’centered on China and following the “five-lun” international relations” class hierarchy, the center protects the surrounding area and the surrounding Yuping Center forms a pattern of mutual dependence and coexistence between China and its neighbors. The death of the lips, the rise and fall of the dying, and the gradual development of the Chinese world order; because China has never interfered in the internal affairs of the country, it has also developed the “rule of inaction” of national autonomy and kingdom autonomy, which is able to stabilize the traditional East Asian international system. For a thousand years.”

Other Chinese scholars outside of the mainland have also been influenced by the wave of *Tianxiaism* – even though in different grades. The Hongkong natives Michael Ng-quinn and Victoria Hui have pointed out that Chinese *Tianxia* universalism did exist long before the start of European history.⁴⁷ The approach of other Chinese scholars in overseas is a mixture of admiration and caution.

44 C. Shih, “The China Studies That Defend Chineseness: The Im/possibility of China-centrism in the Divided Sino-phone World”, 2011, available at: <https://www.20.uni-heidelberg.de/md/20/sino/research/09shihchihyudefendchineseness.doc> (accessed 28 March 2019)

45 C. Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang, *Balance of relationship and the Chinese School of IR. Being simultaneously Confucian, post-Western and post-hegemonic*, Zhang Yongjin and Chang Teng-chi, 2017, p. 179

46 Q. Zhang, “Disintegration and Regeneration of the Modern East Asian International System”, *China Social Science News*, (Section 613, June 27th 2014), T. Chang, *Debating the Chinese School of IR: A reflective review from Taiwan*, Y. Zhang and T. Chang, 2017, pp. 87-90

47 C. Shih, op.cit, p. 11

Xu Tao who teaches in Japan comments:

"In the *Tianxia* System theory, not the state, but *Tianxia* = world-ness is the most basic political concept and political principle. In a word, *Tianxia* is presented as a legitimate world order view... So 'with the recognition framework of' state-internationality-world-ness' the '*Tianxia*' system... will contribute to the solution of globalized world issues."⁴⁸

But on the other hand with the experience of an observer outside of China he warns:⁴⁹

"On the other hand, as Kawashima Shin (2014, pp. 100-114) points out that in the process of constructing 'Chinese theory' or a 'Chinese school', especially (re)interpreting Chinese traditional thought, like '*Tianxia* system' and 'Tribute system', Chinese scholars should be more conscious of the presence of other East Asian countries and hold a talk with their scholars. Most East Asian countries were members of '*Tianxia* system' and 'Tribute system' in the past, and are influenced strongly by China's rise at present. Building a new regional order in East Asia and constructing a new regional identity based on regional historical recourses and dialogues of knowledge with East-Asian/Asian countries may be the most urgent problem for Chinese scholars."

A comment from Prof. Zhao Suisheng, Denver University, USA, points in the same direction. He does not hesitate to find merits in the old system of tributary states:

"Although the tributary system sometimes embarrassed the tributary states and bore a heavy cost to China, it was valuable for both the tributary states and the tribute receiver... The Chinese court also benefited from this system. Although, in financial terms, China gave far more than it received, the tribute received from neighbouring countries was the ritual that acknowledged the superiority of the Chinese culture, recognized the greatness of the Chinese civilization and the existence of Chinese authority... The Chinese world order was an ethical hierarchy, maintained by the power of the Chinese civilization."⁵⁰

But Zhao also emphasises that contrary to the idealistic views of *Tianxiaism* "warfare was constant in imperial China" and Korean scholars show concern whether with *Tianxiaism* "an expansionist-territorial imagination" has come back and gained ground in China as it is re-emerging as a great power.⁵¹

Zhao finishes his article raising doubts about contradictions which he traces in nowaday's Chinese foreign policy:

"Reconstructing the benevolent Chinese world order but following social Darwinist logic in the twenty-first century, how a powerful China would seek to regain its historical

48 T. Xu, 'The Emergence of the "Chinese School"? The "Sinicization" of International Relations Theory in China', *ICCS Journal of Modern Chinese Studies*, Vol.II (1) 2018, p. 35

49 T. Xu, op.cit, p. 37

50 Zhao Suisheng, "Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the imperial cycle and the rise of China", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 2015, Available at: <http://7dx.doi.org/10.1080/1080/1080/10670564.215.1030913>, p. 4

51 Zhao Suisheng, op.cit, p. 8

preeminence in the region and behave on the world stage is anyone's guess."⁵²

As far as I am concerned, I cannot but confer my own scepticism in regard of the hard-core sino-centric *Tianxia* theories. Commenting the ideal of benevolent sage kings we may consent that at the beginning of Zhou Dynasty according to Chinese historiography such rulers may have existed. Yet in the course of generations not few kings turned out to be undutiful and unvirtuous.

The tyrannical king Li was expelled in 842 BC. Order was reestablished by king Xuan (827-788 BC) not by moral charisma but by successful warfare.⁵³ It might also be true that the league of independent Chinese states starting 771 BC after the death of the undutiful and unvirtuous king Yao under the hegemonic leadership of the strongest state ("ba") has paid tribute to virtue and benevolence.⁵⁴

Alas, the system under humane and moral auspices did not last very long. The multi-state-system was seriously affected when contesting "bas" were emerging. The system perverted from a peace – keeping to a warmonger system. States were no longer evaluated by cultural and moral progress but by their standard of military power. Already at the time of Confucius in the common language the terms "A state of how many li in square" (1 li= 95km²) and "A state of how many war chariots" were alternatively used, even by the sage himself.⁵⁵

Chinese princes, who in the course of time acclaimed kings titles, preferred aggressive power politics to Confucian benevolence and have been scarcely virtuous as one can easily learn from the Analects and Confucius Annals of Spring and Autumn. To style the tributary state system evolving after the unification of the empire in 221 BC as a kind of peaceful and benevolent world order has not few flaws. That goes for the historical facts, which get quite another not so peaceful evaluation by numerous authors,⁵⁶ as well as for the virtuousness of the paternalizing Chinese emperors. Even though one has to admit that the Chinese Empire was more peaceful than other big powers and in contrast to Russia, which absorbed its neighbors, the smaller states around China did survive. As far as the virtuousness of Chinese emperors is concerned Prof. Liu Dalin in two voluminous opuses has pointed out how many Chinese emperors were sex maniacs driven by their desires in such an extent that they did not pay attention to what was going on in and outside China.⁵⁷

52 Zhao Suisheng, op.cit, p. 22

53 Chang Chi-yun, *The Restoration of the Western Chou Dynasty Through its Northern and Southern Expedition*. Chinese Culture (Taipei), Vol.4, No.4, March 1963, pp. 22-28

54 See Liu Bochi, Ch'un – Meng Zhang – Zhi (The Conference of States and the policy of Alliances during Spring – and Autumn Period), Taipei, 1962, p. 21, Tang Wu, *Zhongguo Yu Guojifa*, (China and International Law) Vol.1 Beijing 1957, p. 3; Gerd Kaminski, *Völkerrecht und Außenpolitik: Historische Grundlagen*, Vienna 1972, pp. 69-70

55 James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Vol.1, Confucian Analects, London 1892, Reprint Taipei, p. 247

56 See for instance Angela Schottenhammer, *War and Peace along the Historical Silk Roads*, Gerd Kaminski (ed), Wen Versus Wu, Vienna 2016, pp.34-38; William A. Callahan, *Tianxia, Empire and the World: Chinese Visions of World Order for the 21st Century*, William A. Callahan, Elena Barbantseva, (ed); *China Orders the World*, Washington 2011, p. 104; Wang Yuankang, *Harmony and War*, Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics, New York 2011, pp. 34-180

57 D. Liu, *Zhongguo Gudai Xingwenhua 中国古代性文化 (Sex Culture in Ancient China)*; D. Liu, *Zhongguo Xingshi Tujian 中国性事图鉴 (Illustrated History of Sex Culture in Ancient China)*; See also G. Kaminski, *Das Spiel von Wolken und Regen*, Vienna 2019 especially, pp. 176-205

Therefore I tend to join those critics who believe that *Tianxiaism* is an interesting, highly romantic, idealistic approach but divorced from the real facts of Chinese history.⁵⁸

Xi Jinping and *Tianxiaism*

First of all it should be noted that traditional elements from Chinese history and philosophy did not start to influence Xi Jinping at the time of evolving *Tianxiaism*.

China daily has published a list of books on President Xi Jinping's shelves. It starts with a picture book on the Chinese national hero Yuefei.⁵⁹

Yue Fei was not only famous in Chinese history because of the words his mother tattooed on his back "Serve the country loyally" but especially for his call versus the Northern barbarians: "Give back our mountains and valleys!" Because of his staunch fighting for regaining the lost territories and his uprightness Yue Fei has been canonized as the president of the underworld commission of adjusting justice. There the good and bad deeds of deceased are appraised with a final judgement of Yue Fei.⁶⁰

The book on Yue Fei was Xi Jinping's favorite when he was five years old. It is likely that Xi Jinping at the turn of the century became part of the mainstream of re-evaluating classical Chinese wisdom related with anti-West cultural nationalism⁶¹ which I mentioned at the beginning of this article. Self grown scepticism towards prevalence of Western ideas in China can be traced in a lot of phenomena which happened after he took over the leadership in party and state.⁶²

58 See fi. Feng Yhang, Confucian Foreign Policy Traditions in Chinese History, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 2015, p. 197, pp.200-202, 213; Yao Suisheng (2015), p. 21; Thuy T Do, China's Rise and the "Chinese Dream" in IR Theory, Reforce Paper presented to the Second Oceamic Conference on International Studies, University of Malbourne, 9-11 July 2014, pp. 7-9, 11; Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan, The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol.5, 2012; p. 16, 19, 31; Hun Joon Kim, Will IR Theory with Chinese Characteristics be a Powerful Alternative?, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2016, p. 78; Allen Carlson, It Should Not Only Be about Nationalism: China's Pluralistic National Identity and its Implications for Chinese Foreign Relations, *International Studies*, 2011, 48, p. 232; Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, Why is There no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on, *International Relations of the Pacific*, 2017, p. 32; William A. Callahan, Elena Barabantseva, *China Orders the World*, Washington 2011, p. 91-p.117; Salvatore Babones, Taking China Seriously: Relationality, *Tianxia* and the "Chinese School" of International Relations, *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, Oxford University Press (USA), 11.2.2019, p. 9-13; Nele Noesselt, Is there a Chinese School of IR?, *Giga Working Papers*, No.188, March 2012, p. 19,21-22; Nele Noesselt, Revisiting the debate on constructing a theory of international relations with chinese characteristics, *The China Quarterly* 222 (2015), p. 442-444; Zhang Feng, *The Tsinghua Approach*, p. 87, 95-96, Zhang Feng, *The Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia*, Reviewed by Feng Zhang, *Global Asia Book Review*, p. 111, 112

59 Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201701/01/WS5a38cd5da3108bc8c6735d56_1.html

60 Anne Goodrich, *Chinese Hells*, St. Augustin 1981, p. 27

61 Another important research on this subject is Guo Yingjie's *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China*, which makes clear that among the Chinese people there was growing national conscience and that among the pre-Xin leadership there were already Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan who promoted national pride and objection towards blind veneration of the West. New York 2004, pp. 32-34; Generally about Traditional elements in Xi's politics see Gerd Kaminski, *Xi Jinping, Chinesischer Traum und die chinesische Außenpolitik*, Gerd Kaminski (ed), Wen versus Wu, Vienna 2016 and Gerd Kaminski, *Traditional Elements in Xi Jinpings Socialism*, Gerd Kaminski (ed), *Chinese Strategies*, Gerd Kaminski 2019, pp. 20-70

62 To mention a few examples: the control of teaching materials used by foreign lecturers at Chinese universities, the recent rule to prevent Chinese primary and middle school students from enrolling in international schools or international sections of regular schools (China Daily April 9, 2019), the objections against celebrating Christmas and Valentines in China and the attempt to popularize Chinese New Year instead all over the world, to replace Santa Clause by kitchengod Cao Wang Ye, Valentine's Day by Sheperd and Weaver Maid, the revival of rules from the sixties and seventies for Chinese officials about getting too close with foreigners, the sinicizing of Catholic and protestant churches, the commending of Chinese dress in comparison with jeans, the pressure on Kentucky Fried Chicken to promote ancient Chinese culture in their restaurants and more of the same. - See Kaminski (2019), pp. 39-50

But there is no doubt that think tanks and individual scholars were and are exercising influence on the Chinese leaders. Xi Jinping makes no exception.⁶³ At the beginning of his administration Xi made clear that he shares the opinions of the considerably large group of leaders and scholars who believe that, taking into account China's economical and political rise, Deng Xiaoping's advise that China should keep a low profile is outdated.⁶⁴ The assertiveness of Xi Jinping's foreign policy during the first years seems to mirror opinions of colonel Liu Mingfu and other hawks of the PLA.⁶⁵ William Callahan and other Western advisors believe that Liu Mingfu's bullish book "Chinese Dream" (2010), which precedes Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream", had an impact on Xi's political convictions.⁶⁶ Liu Mingfu's arguments are much more pointed than those of the *Tianxia*ists but he also pays tribute to *Tianxia* ideals by emphasizing China's historical function to lead the world and in regard of the tributary other rulers "like little brothers". Yet contrary to the Tsinghua school he stresses that China that time has been "too peaceful".⁶⁷ But according to some scholars⁶⁸ and also in my opinion it is also possible to trace in Xi's political line the *Tianxia* ideas of Yan Xuetong and his Tsinghua School:

"After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, we see a clear foreign policy change, in which China starts to emphasize the importance of 'striking a balance between upholding justice and seeking interests' (*Yi Li Guan*) in international relations. Although the Chinese government does not directly recognize that they adopt some elements of 'moral realism' in making foreign policy decisions, the clear similarity between the two reveals that Yan's ideas were purchased in the 'free market.'"

This is also proved by the Chinese media. Xi Jinping: One world, one Home: "These diplomatic golden sentences reach the hearts of the people."⁶⁹ Xi Jinping's *Tianxia* Weigong – the world is one:

"The Chinese have admired a *Tianxia* feeling since ancient times. From 'harmony is more important' and harmony of all nations to the 'what you don't want don't do it to others' and 'All in the four seas are brothers (Confucius)."⁷⁰

Xi Jinping's newest saying: The root of *Tianxia* is the country and the root of the country is the family. On occasion of spring festival 2018 Xi Jinping said:

63 A member of one of the most influential think tanks told me recently: "Xi sometimes listens to us, sometimes not."

64 G.. Kaminski (2016), op.cit, pp. 276-284

65 G. Kaminski (2016), op.cit, pp. 243-269, 313-316

66 W. A. Callahan: China dreams: 20 visions of the future, New York, 2013; p.58, see also E. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy, 2012, pp. 24-27

67 M. Liu, The China Dream, New York 2015, p. 16, 68, 102

68 Huiyun Feng and Kaihe, Why Chinese IR Scholars Matter, The Griffith-Tsinghua Project "How China Sees The World" Working Paper, Series No.1 (2016), p.11, see also p. 5

69 W. Liu, CCTV Website, 2018, Available at: <http://news.cctv.com/2018/06/23/ARTI9HHB1V9pD2SdU3RMoSCF180623.shtml> (accessed 7 March 2018)

70 W. Li, J. Li, 31.1.2018, *Renminribao Haiwai Ban*, Available at: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2018-01/31/content_1833725.htm (accessed 7 March 2019)

“Integrate personal dreams and family dreams with national and international dreams. With the wisdom and strength of more than 400 million families and more than 1.3 billion people we will gather together to win the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and realize the greatness of the Chinese nation.”⁷¹

Brown points out that Xi Jinping’s assertiveness has been rather successful.⁷²

“Much of the testing of commitments and resolve that China is clearly involved with around the region – building installations on islands, using proxy agents to clash with others and demanding observation of borders right down to the coast of Malaysia – shows how much latitude China has. It is able to spot weaknesses, chinks in people’s armour, and raise questions of whether, in a crisis, people would really stand by their alliance.”

This counts especially for the first years of Xi Jinping’s administration. I agree with scholars like Kery Brown that Xi Jinping’s overture of assertiveness was powered by *Tianxiaism*.

On the other hand this assertiveness has produced a lot of critique outside of China but even in China. Just to pick a few examples. Lisa Rofel university of California writes in her essay “China’s *Tianxia* worldings”: “I would agree that this postsocialist world is much farther away from any concept of *Tianxia* than the socialist past.”⁷³ The director of Asia Studies at the European Council of Foreign Relations calls Xi’s foreign policy “ambitious and expansive”. “He still has both the time and the power to correct this course.”⁷⁴

But this advice to adjust course comes at a time when we can observe indications that this is already happening in the recent years. Political setbacks – see above “We have enemies all over the world” and economic setbacks did contribute to a more cautious approach to *Tianxiaism*. Chinese foreign policy seems to move away from Tsinghua Schools assertive and sinocentric concepts in the direction of Xu Jilin pluralistic relationalist *Tianxiaism*.⁷⁵ Or as the New York Times in its May 7th 2019 issue has chosen to put it in a more blunt way: Lian Yizheng (former editor of the Hongkong Economic Journal) in “Xi Jinping Wanted Global Dominance He Overshot”

Another paper, Global Times, which is a speaking tube of the Chinese Communist party, published a commentary by Shi Yinhong, director of the center for American Studies at the People’s University, expressing concern about “blimpish patriotism and overdone confidence” as early as November 26th 2016.

71 Y. Gao, 2018, “*Tianxia zhi Ben zai Guo, Guo zhi ben zai Jia*”, *Zhongguo zhi Sheng* [website], Available at: http://china.cnr.cn/yaowen/20180215/t20180215_524136549.shtml (accessed 7 March 2019)

72 K. Brown, *China’s World*, London, New York, p. 213

73 B. Wang (ed), *Chinese Visions of World Order*, p. 224

74 E.C. Economy, 2019, “The Problem with Xi’s China Model”, *Foreign Affairs*, Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-03-06/problem-xis-china-model> (accessed 7 March 2019)

75 See f.i. Xi’s speech at UN, Geneva, Jan 18th 2017: “Work Together to Build a Community of a Shared Future for Mankind”. In an information letter for the army, the Chinese journalist Duo Wei had an interview with Chu Yin, member of the Global Think Tank. Chu emphasized that *Tianxia* never comprised the whole world but only China and its neighboring countries. (June 2018)

In fact, the assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy is fading in favor of giving more weight to harmony in spite of differing opinions, shared interests, common destiny of mankind, win-win and peace. The Chinese core interests, which have been expanded before to include the South Sea Islands, according to talks with other members of Chinese think tanks have been readjusted again.

These signals are well received at least in the European community. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2019 Angela Merkel spoke against American exceptionalism, particularism and selfishness. By asking for "win-win-solutions" she used Xi Jinping's terms.

My recent talks with experts from units under the Central Committee, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and top academic circles, who probably do not care much to be cited, could harvest similar opinions: The USA are in decline but their hegemony shall last for a comparatively longer time. If China-centrism, then only local. The "China Rules the World Theories" from assertive members of the Tsinghua School cannot be taken serious. China does not follow the Russian "hard pattern", but keeps to a "low profile". China is a regional power. In regard of Russia: "We don't share everything". The Chinese media are against the USA. But stable relations with the USA is important. The USA are demonizing China. China must prove the contrary. China has a lot in common with the EU. We have much in common especially, when it comes to our old civilizations. China could learn "morals" from EU. In regard of 16+1 those countries have bad infrastructure and are short of money, but China should respect the EU intents. BRI investments should be done more cautiously. The EU's worries regarding "sensitive enterprises are to be respected." "EU and China are the same camp."

The influential Prof. Wang Jisi, Beijing University and President of the very important think tank Institute of International and Strategic Studies declared at the time of the overtake by the new administration "The Chinese leadership does not dream of turning China into a hegemon or standard bearer".⁷⁶

Looking at recent facts and figures he is probably right.

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⁷⁶ J. Wang, 2011, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com//articles/china/2011-02-20/china-s-search-grand-strategy> (accessed 1 February 2019)

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Герд Камински

Tianxia и кинеска спољна политика

Апстракт

Све већа моћ и самопоуздање плус пораст национализма одговорни су за развој синоцентричне школе Tianxia. Предводници ове школе су Zhao Tingyang и Yan Xuetong. Tianxiaguan – Tianxiaism преиспитује класична западна правила међународних односа и очувања мира нудећи кинески образац који се заснива на искуствима династије Џоу и каснијег система вазалних држава. Ова група кинеских научника сматра да би модел Tianxia био успешнији од Уједињених нација. Након много пажње и посвећености неким од принципа Tianxiai размишљања током првих година администрације Си Ђинпинга, чини се да утицај школе бледи, а повратак на опрезну спољну политику Денг Сјаопинга прилично је вероватан.

Кључне речи: Tianxia, Tianxiaism, Zhao Tingyang, Yan Xuetong, Џоу династија, систем вазалних држава, Кина - централизам, конфуцијанизам, Денг Сјаопинг, Си Ђинпинг